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Summary 
This thesis examines the independence of the UN treaty bodies, both 
in its entirety and the autonomy of the individual treaty body 
members. Since independence is very difficult to measure 
empirically, this paper uses the theoretical framework of Principal-
Trustee theory as a tool by which the independence can be 
understood. This instrument allows us to examine the independence 
of the treaty body system by looking at what possibilities the state 
parties have to influence their behavior.  
 The UN treaty body system is explained in detail, including its 
purpose and how it has developed over the years. All the various 
ways the committees have to monitor the human rights situation in 
the state parties are also described. This section also includes a 
discussion on the apparent paradox that states are voluntarily giving 
up part of their sovereignty to cooperate with a system whose main 
task is to criticize them.   
 The independence of the treaty bodies is examined by the 
application of Principal-Trustee theory. This theory is therefore 
explained thoroughly, including its development from the broader 
type of agent theory that preceded it. The theory posits that a 
Principal in order to gain legitimacy creates a new entity to which it 
delegates power. This is called the trustee. In the context of this 
thesis the Principal consists of the state parties to the human rights 
conventions since it was the states that created the monitoring 
bodies, and still control the budget and appointment processes, 
while the treaty bodies make up the Trustee. 
  The theory explains that there are four main ways for the 
principal to sanction the trustee in order to influence its behavior. 
These are A) to fire the trustee, B) to refuse to re-appoint her, C)to re-
write the delegation contract and D) to change the budget the trustee 
is dependent of. These four ways of sanctioning are applied to the 
legal and institutional framework of the treaty bodies in order to 
determine their independence. While it is hard to fire a treaty body 
expert, they are subject to re-election after fairly short terms of 
mandate. In order to re-write the delegation contract the states need 
to amend the original treaties, a very difficult process but the states 
do have the power to change the budget. Taken together these 
factors point towards the treaty bodies being fairly independent.  
 This is also the conclusion given when comparing the treaty 
bodies with some other actors whose independence has been 
threatened recently; UN civil servants, Special Procedures and 
International Judges.  
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 This descriptive analysis is followed by a normative discussion 
on how independent the treaty bodies ought to be. In the context of 
the strengthening process a Code of Conduct has been proposed that 
would make the experts accountable to the member states. Even 
though there might be some gains of legitimacy it is the opinion of 
this author that the system would function better without it.  
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Sammanfattning 
Denna uppsats undersöker FN:s människorätts kommittéer och hur 
oavhängiga de kan sagas vara, både vad gäller hela systemet 
sammantaget och de enskilda medlemmarna. Eftersom det är svårt 
att mäta oavhängighet empiriskt använder denna uppsats ett 
teoretiskt ramverk som förklarar Principal-Förvaltare förhållanden. 
Detta ramverk är ett verktyg som kan användas för att förstå 
oavhängighet eftersom det möjliggör undersökningar av vilka 
möjligheter medlemsstaterna har att påverka 
människorättskommittéernas beteende.  
 Systemet med FN:s övervaknings kommittéer förklaras i detalj, 
tillsammans med dess ursprung, syfte och alla metoder de har för att 
övervaka staternas beteende. Detta avsnitt innehåller också en 
diskussion om paradoxen att stater frivilligt ger upp delar av sin 
suveränitet för att samarbeta med ett system vars främsta funktion är 
att kritisera dem.  
 Kommittéernas oavhängighet undersöks genom att Principal-
Förvaltarteorin appliceras på dem. Teorin förklaras därför 
genomgående, även hur den utvecklades från den bredare 
Agentteorin. Ramverket förutsätter att det finns en Principal som, för 
att uppnå legitimitet, skapar en enhet som den delegerar makt till. 
Denna nya enhet kallas Förvaltaren. När det gäller denna uppsats 
består Principalen av alla stater som är part till FN:s 
människorättskonventioner. Det är nämligen de som skapade 
systemet och fortfarande har kontrollen över vilka som utses till 
experter i kommittéerna och hur budgeten ska se ut. 
Människorättskommittéerna i sin tur är Förvaltaren i detta avseende.  
 Teorin förklarar att det finns fyra huvudsakliga metoder för 
Principalen att sanktioner Förvaltaren för att försöka påverka hennes 
beteende. Dessa är att A)avskeda henne, B) inte på nytt utse henne, 
C) skriva om kontraktet som innehåller villkoren för hennes arbete 
och D) ändra budgeten som förvaltaren är beroende av.  Dessa fyra 
metoder appliceras på FN:s kommittésystem för att på så sätt 
undersöka dess oavhängighet. Det visar sig vara väldigt svårt för 
staterna att avskeda en expert, men å andra sidan är 
mandatperioderna ganska korta. Att skriva om 
delegationskontraktet är oerhört komplicerat eftersom de villkoren 
slås fast i själva originalkonventionerna, men staterna har kvar 
kontrollen över budgeten och kan därigenom utöva inflytande över 
systemet. Men sammantaget pekar dessa faktorer, samt en 
jämförande analys av FN-tjänstemän, Människorättsrådets Speciella 
Procedurer och internationella domare på att kommittéerna är 
relativt oavhängiga staterna.  
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 På denna deskriptiva analys följer en normativ diskussion om 
hur oavhängiga övervakningskommittéerna borde vara. Under den 
pågående reformprocessen har en Uppförandekod föreslagits som 
skulle göra experterna ansvariga inför medlemsstaterna. Även om 
det kan finnas vissa fördelar vad gäller legitimitet med en sådan kod, 
är det författares åsikt att systemet skulle fungera bättre utan den. 
 8 
Abbreviations 
CAT Convention Against Torture and Other  
 Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
 or Committee Against Torture 
CED Committee on Enforced Disappearances  
CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of All  
 forms of Discrimination Against Women 
 or Committee on the Elimination of  
 Discrimination Against Women 
CERD Committee on the Elimination of Racial  
 Discrimination 
CESCR Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural  
 Rights 
CMW Committee on Migrant Workers 
CRC Convention on the Rights of the Child 
 or Committee on the Rights of the Child 
CRPD Convention on the Rights of Persons with  
 Disabilities  
 or Committee on the Rights of Persons with  
 Disabilities 
ECOSOC United Nations Economic and Social 
  Council 
ICED International Convention on Enforced  
 Disappearances 
ICERD International Convention on the Elimination  
 of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
ICRMW International Convention on the Rights of  
 Migrant Workers 
ICESCR International Covenant on Economic, Social  
 and Cultural Rights  
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political  
 Rights 
HRC Human Rights Committee 
OHCHR United Nations Office of the  
 High Commissioner for Human  
 Rights 
P-A theory Principal-Agent theory 
P-T theory Principal-Trustee theory 
SP Special Procedures of the Human Rights  
 Council 
SPT Subcommittee on the Prevention of Torture 
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for  
 Refugees 
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UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Background 
The United Nations Treaty Bodies have been described as the heart 
of the UN human rights machinery.1 Yet, at the moment, this heart is 
having difficulties pumping. The system has faced problems for a 
long time but they are growing more serious every year. In order to 
combat this there has been many efforts to reform and strengthen the 
treaty body system. As early as 1989 an independent expert issued a 
report on how to make implementation of the treaty body system 
more effective and how to deal with the long-term growth of the 
system.2 Since then there have been several other initiatives, but the 
problems are yet to be solved.  
 The problems facing the treaty bodies are of a twofold nature. 
One is that states are not fulfilling their obligations to report. In 2012 
only 16 percent of the States were handing in their reports on time3 
and for some of the Committees4 20 percent of the States have never 
submitted their initial report at all and consequently never taken part 
in a session.5 The other problem is that the system has grown in a 
dramatic way over the last decade without a corresponding increase 
in financial and human resources. This has led to huge backlogs of 
reports paralyzing the work of the treaty bodies. For some 
committees the consideration of a report takes place up to six years 
after it is submitted, rendering most of the information obsolete. 
 In order to deal with this, the High Commissioner of Human 
Rights has initiated a Strengthening Process of the UN human rights 
treaty body system. The goal of this initiative is to improve the 
visibility, accessibility and impact of the treaty bodies on right-
holders and duty-bearers at the national level by strengthening the 
system.6 
                                                 
1 Secretary General’s remarks at Treaty Body Strengthening Consultation for States 
Parties, New York, 2 April 2012 http://www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=5967 
retrieved on 11/09/2012. 
2 Note by the Secretary General: Effective implementation of international instruments 
on human rights, including reporting obligations under international instruments on 
human rights. Published 8 November 1989 UN Doc. A/44/668. 
3 Pillay, N. Strengthening the United Nations human rights treaty body system – A 
report by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2012 p. 21. 
Available at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/HRTD/docs/HCreportonTBstrengthening21061
2.doc 
4 CESCR, CAT and HRC. 
5 N. Pillay supra note 3, p. 22 
6 Ibid. p. 29. 
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1.2 Purpose  
One issue that has been highlighted during this strengthening 
process, involving the OHCHR, the treaty bodies themselves as well 
as member states and NGOs, is the independence of the treaty 
bodies. According to the treaties that founded them they are 
supposed to have the liberty to change their working methods and 
decide their rules of procedures by themselves.7 However, many of 
the suggested changes and proposed reforms brought forward by the 
treaty bodies themselves have been met with strong opposition and 
have not been implemented.8 This underscores the somewhat 
paradoxical nature of a system that is funded and to a certain extent 
controlled by the same actors that the system is meant to scrutinize.  
 The conventions might give the treaty bodies the mandate to 
engage in many activities, but as long as it is the state parties that 
elects the treaty experts and controls the budget, the treaty bodies 
will never be fully independent. Since the main purpose of the treaty 
bodies is to monitor how well the state parties comply with their 
human rights obligations it is very important that they can maintain 
their independence. If the states that are supposed to be scrutinized 
can impose their own will on the treaty bodies, and influence them in 
their work, an impartial examination of the human rights situation 
will not be possible. For the treaty bodies to have any legitimacy they 
have to be able to decide for themselves how to perform their 
functions. An examination performed by a state controlled puppet 
would not shed much light on the de-facto human rights situation in 
that state.  
 The purpose of this thesis is therefore to answer the following 
questions:  
How independent are the UN treaty bodies? 
 and,  
How independent ought the treaty bodies to be? 
The thesis is therefore interested not only in the descriptive part of 
independence but also the normative discussion that is its natural 
consequence. In answering these two questions there are a number of 
definitions that first needs to be settled. By treaty bodies, this thesis 
refers to all committees assigned with monitoring the 
implementation of the UN human rights treaties. These are the 
Human Rights Committee (HRC), the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), the Committee on the 
                                                 
7 For example ICCPR art. 39.2, or ICERD art. 10. 
8 For instance there have been requests for more meeting time and additional administrative 
support from the secretariat, but more on this below, in chapter 4.1. 
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Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the 
Committee Against Torture (CAT), the Committee on the Rights of 
the Child (CRC), the Committee on Migrant Workers (CMW), the 
Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture (SPT), the Committee on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) and the Committee on 
Enforced Disappearance (CED).9 This thesis will examine the 
independence both of the treaty bodies as a whole but also that of 
their individual members.  
 It is slightly more challenging to clarify what the notion of 
independence means. Therefore, this is discussed in further detail in 
chapter 3. A small introductory explanation, however, follows below. 
In the legal debate there has been a separation of independence to from 
independence from. The former term refers to specific decisions and 
whether they, in their given context, were independently taken or 
not. That is, without the decision-maker adapting his or her 
conclusion to please another stakeholder. The latter term, refers 
instead to the incentive and limits that the decision-maker has vis-à-
vis other institutions, in other words if he or she has independence 
from the other actors. While the former approach centers on the 
specific context of specific decisions and whether or not these 
verdicts have gone contrary to the will of the actor trying to influence 
the outcome, the latter focuses more on the institutional framework, 
and whether it is being abided by or not.10 This thesis will focus 
mainly on independence from since it gives a broader understanding of 
how the framework of the UN system works. Since the aim of the 
treaty bodies is to scrutinize states, it is states that are most likely to 
try to apply pressure on the treaty bodies; it is also the states that are 
the creators of the whole system. Therefore it is the autonomy from 
the states that is the main focus. Efforts to influence the treaty bodies 
from third actors will not be dealt with to the same extent.  
Independence to is better suited when looking at judicial procedures 
and since the monitoring bodies are of a non-, or at most quasi-, 
judicial character, independence from is the more helpful framework.  
 Since this thesis concerns itself with both the treaty body system 
as a whole and with the individual members, it has to deal with two 
                                                 
9 It has now become custom to refer to all the committees founded by the human rights 
treaties as ’treaty bodies’ even though the conventions themselves only refer to 
’Committee’. It should also be noted that CESCR is technically not a treaty body since it 
was established by ECOSOC and not by a human rights treaty but for all intents and 
purposes it amounts to one. The Subcommittee on the Prevention of Torture (SPT) is also 
slightly different from the other treaty bodies, since it relies on state visits rather than state 
reporting, and was established by an optional protocol rather than an original treaty. But for 
the purposes of this thesis SPT can also be considered a treaty body. In the thesis, the terms 
‘treaty body’ ‘committee’ and ‘monitoring body’ will be used interchangeably. 
10 Ríos-Figueroa, J. Judicial Independence: Definition, Measurement, and Its Effects on 
Corruption. An analysis of Latin America, 2006, pp. 3-4.  
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different sides of independence. When it comes to the system in its 
entirety it will be the just mentioned independence from. That is, their 
ability to perform their duties and choose their own direction and 
methods without having to adapt to the will of, or try to please, the 
member states. When dealing with the individual members and their 
independence, the focus will be on what possibilities the state parties 
have to influence their behavior to suit their own purposes. This part 
will also examine what standards of accountability apply to the 
treaty members. Not that being held accountable is necessarily a 
limitation of an actor’s independence, but the more norms one has to 
follow, the larger is the risk that ones independent wish will be 
impeded. It is therefore a factor that needs to be considered when 
examining independence.   
1.3 Method and Theory 
Since the treaty bodies main function is to monitor how well state 
parties are complying with their human rights obligations and to 
criticize them when their commitments are not being met, there is a 
natural opposition between the states and the committees. This 
would not necessarily amount to a problem, but because it is the 
state parties, through the General Assembly, that fund and therefore 
have the financial control over the system, there are obvious risks 
that the independence of the treaty bodies might be affected. This 
thesis will therefore examine the relationship between the treaty 
bodies and the state parties. By looking at how these two actors 
correlate to each other, it is possible to deduce how much 
independence the monitoring bodies have.  
 The methodological approach of this paper will be that of 
rational choice. This theory builds on the assumption that the 
behavior of actors are motivated by them seeking their individual 
goals in a world of constraints.11 In a world where no actor can have 
everything she wants, she is forced to make choices on which route 
to take in order to achieve the most benefits for herself. What these 
individual goals of the actors are can vary greatly and the theory 
presupposes in no way that all actors are egoistical, only that they 
strive to realize their own goals, whatever they may be.  
 In this its broadest form, rational choice does not always help 
provide valid conclusions. When looking at the independence of the 
treaty bodies, a more detailed framework will therefore be used: that 
of Principal-Trustee theory (P-T theory). This theory, which as part of 
the rational choice tradition was first developed in economics and 
then later used in political science, has contributed greatly to 
                                                 
11 Carlsnaes, W., Risse-Kappen, T. & Simmons, B. A. (red.), Handbook of international 
relations [Electronic resource] 2009, p.74. 
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organizational theory in these fields.12 Yet it has only rarely been 
applied to international human rights law.13 This despite of the 
utility the framework has to offer also in this context. The theory will 
be explained and analyzed in greater detail in chapter 3, but a basic 
definition is as follows: P-T theory is a tool that can be used when 
looking at the nature of the relationship between a principal 
(something that delegates power) and a trustee (the entity that 
receives the power delegated).14 It is a framework that can offer a 
helpful lens through which to look at the relationship between the 
treaty bodies and the state parties. This will provide a deeper 
understanding of how they relate to each other and the effect the 
structure has on the independence of the committees.   
 P-T theory was developed from a broader framework called 
Principal-Agent theory. In order to understand the independence of 
trustees, it is necessary to also understand the logics of delegation to 
agents. Simply put, an agent is an actor who the principal delegates 
power to in order to achieve gains in effectiveness, while a trustee 
gets her mandate because the principal wants to gain legitimacy.15 A 
more in-depth discussion of this distinction is provided in chapter 3. 
When diving deeper into these theories and how they help explain 
the independence of the treaty bodies, this thesis will draw from the 
work of Philip Alston whose application of P-A and P-T theory in a 
human rights setting corresponds very well with the objectives of 
this paper.  Karen Alter has given a big contribution to the 
development of P-T theory, and also her ideas will be taken into 
account.  Since independence is very hard to measure empirically, it 
will be examined from a more theoretical point of view where the 
logical conclusions of applying Principal-Trustee theory will be used 
to understand how independent the treaty bodies are, and what risks 
might exist in the current system. 
 Even though these theories originate in international relations 
theory rather than international law, they can still be of great value 
by situating legal rules and institutions in their political context so 
that the level of abstraction of the norms is reduced and their 
practical consequences highlighted.16 Research in the field of human 
rights cannot be done in a vacuum, because the norms themselves do 
not exist in one. Therefore, theories of international relations must be 
used to give political context so that the law can be understood. 
                                                 
12 Eisenhardt, K. M. Agency Theory 1989, p. 57. 
13 The notable exceptions being Hawkins, D. and Jacoby, W. Agent permeability, principal 
delegation and the European Court of Human Rights, 2008; and Alston, P. Hobbling the 
Monitors 2011. 
14 Alston, P. Hobbling the Monitors, 2011, p. 627. 
15 Alter, K. J. Agents or Trustees? 2008, p. 38. 
16 Abbott, K.W. International Relations Theory, International Law, and the Regime 
Governing Atrocities in Internal Conflicts 1999, p. 362. 
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 The thesis will also follow a classical method of international law 
in its descriptive parts.  This entails going to the sources of law, the 
international treaties creating the monitoring bodies. And in want of 
a court or other judicial instance having interpreted these treaties, 
further information will be sought in the doctrinal work of 
international legal scholars as well as the documents issued by the 
UN itself.  
1.4 Delimitations 
In order to make this thesis focused it will mainly look at two parts 
of the independence of the treaty bodies. The first is how the 
committees are able to change their rules of procedure and working 
methods without being limited by the state parties. Since it is the 
state parties, through the General Assembly and the Secretariat of the 
UN, that provides the necessary facilities to the committees, they 
always have the last say when a proposal from a treaty body entails 
new costs. The influence of individual states on specific 
communications therefore falls outside of the scope of the paper.  
 The other part the thesis will focus on the independence of the 
individual treaty body members. What is it that they can or cannot 
do? What are the limitations? Who are they geld accountable to? 
There have been many proposals put forward during the on-going 
strengthening process but this thesis will only concern itself with 
those relating to the implementation of Codes of Conducts since 
these are the proposals that most directly affect the treaty bodies’ 
independence.  
1.5 Outline 
After this introduction, which explains the objectives and method of 
the paper, Chapter 2 follows with a descriptive explanation of how 
the UN treaty body system works, based on the treaties themselves 
and the scholarly doctrine. This is to give the reader a general 
orientation of what roles this institution plays and how it has 
developed over the years. This chapter begins with a short segment 
on the reasons why states cooperate with the system at all since it is 
important to be aware of the motives of the states when examining 
how they might influence the treaty bodies and limit their 
independence.   
 Chapter 3 has four parts. The first is a detailed clarification of 
what P-T theory entails. It consists of a descriptive part explaining 
the theory and also how the concept of trustees was developed from 
the broader term agents, using the works of legal, but also political, 
scholars. The penultimate segment consists of a breakdown of the 
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critique that has been directed towards the theory and it ends with 
an explanation of how the theory can be used in this context to 
determine the independence of the treaty bodies. 
 The second and third parts of Chapter 3 are the analytical 
segments were the theoretical framework explained previously is 
applied to the treaty body system described in Chapter 2. The parts 
are divided so that one applies the theory to the system in its entirety 
and the other to the individual treaty body experts.  In explaining the 
independence of the individual there is also a comparative part that 
relates them to other actors facing similar challenges. The chapter 
ends with a conclusion of the findings of how independent the treaty 
bodies turned out to be.  
 Chapter 5 contains some final remarks where the findings of the 
thesis are put into a broader context to see what the results might 
bring for the future.  
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2 The UN Treaty Body 
System 
After the disaster that was the Second World War, one of the first 
steps to rebuild the world was the creation of the United Nations. In 
its foundation it recognized the struggle for a better protection of 
human rights and dignity. However, the international climate was 
not such as to allow for binding international legal obligations 
requiring states to protect human rights.  
 One of the main problems was that states were still considered as 
the main actor on the international arena and to limit a state’s 
sovereignty for the sake of human rights was a highly contentious 
idea.17 Indeed, the UN Charter states that promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights is part of its purpose, while at 
the same time limiting itself to act within the principle of non-
intervention when it comes to the domestic jurisdiction of its member 
states.18 However in the sixties the three first major UN human rights 
treaties were drafted and since then six others have followed.19 Step-
by-step the international community was thus able to create a global 
system of human rights.  
 This chapter explains the purpose and functions of this global 
system, also known as the UN human rights treaty body system. A 
descriptive exposition of how the mechanism works provides the 
foundation on which to base the analytical discussion on the 
relationship between the states parties and the treaty bodies in 
Chapter 4. After it has explained the main functions of the 
committees, that is; state-reporting, general comments, individual 
communications and inquiries, the chapter concludes with an 
overview of the on-going strengthening process. But first follows a 
                                                 
17 Bayefsky, A. F. (red), The UN human rights treaty system in the 21st century. 2000, 
p. xvii. 
18 The United Nations Charter, 1 UNTS xvi (in force 24 Oct.1945), Articles1 (3) and 2 
(7).  
19 The 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (ICERD), the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) the 1984 Convention 
Against Torture (CAT), the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), 
the 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All 
Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (ICRMW), the 2006 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) and the 2006 
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance (ICED). There is also the Subcommittee on Torture established 
by the 2002 Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture (OP-CAT).  
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short discussion on what motives states have to participate in the 
system at all. This is important since without an understanding of 
why states subject themselves to the scrutiny of the monitoring 
bodies, any analysis of their work is surely doomed to miss part of 
the point. 
2.1 Why Do States Participate in the 
System?  
By becoming party to the human rights treaties sovereign states 
subject themselves to a host of different monitoring functions to be 
explained below. All of these entail, in one way or another, a 
limitation of the states’ sovereignty. Despite this, the main topic of 
discussion in the scholarly debate regarding the UN treaty body 
system has been on why states do not fully abide by the rules they 
have committed to respect. This has also been the case during the on-
going strengthening process.20 Perhaps a more interesting approach 
is to turn the question around. After all most states do submit their 
reports and they do partake in the constructive dialogue taking place 
in Geneva and even though many recommendations still go unheard, 
a surprisingly large amount are followed, considering there is no 
legal authority that can force states to abide by them. So the question 
to be asked is instead: why do states cooperate with the treaty body 
system at all? 
 By signing up to the system, the state parties delegate authority 
to an actor whose very purpose it is to scrutinize and criticize them.21 
Not only that, the states are also funding the system: 40 per cent of 
the financial resources of the OHCHR comes from the UN general 
budget, approved by the member states through the General 
Assembly and out of the rest, almost 90 per cent comes from 
voluntary donations from the member states directly.22 
Consequently, states, acting rationally, are funding and complying 
with (to at least some extent) a system that is doing its best to expose 
their shortcomings. How can this paradox be explained? 
 There are many different explanations that seem plausible and it 
is not necessarily so that only one is true. The reasons one state 
participates might be very different from what motivates another to 
take part. One explanation is that states taking part in the diplomatic 
                                                 
20 See for example the High Commissioner for Human Rights’ report on treaty body 
strengthening where a substantive part of the section describing the challenges to the 
system deals with non-compliance with reporting obligations. Pillay, N. supra note 3, pp. 
20-28.  
21 More on delegation in Chapter 3. 
22 OHCHR Report 2011 p 124.  Available at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/ohchrreport2011/web_version/ohchr_report2011_web/pages
/downloads.html 
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game might ratify and comply with certain human rights treaties in 
order to be in a stronger position when negotiating with other states 
and in that way achieves advantages in other areas. This relates to 
what Heyns and Viljoen stated in their study on the impact of human 
rights norms on the country level, that the “primary reason why 
states ratify international human rights treaties relates to 
international diplomacy.”23 Another explanation is that states 
appreciate how the treaty bodies can highlight the shortcomings of 
other states. States comply with their obligations believing that they 
benefit more from an exposition of other states’ failures in meeting 
their human right obligations, than they suffer from the (expected) 
mild critique of their own inadequacies. Another reason, put forward 
by Alston, for a government to allow an independent organ to 
scrutinize its activities and performance is that it will prevent future 
governments from crossing certain boundaries that the current 
government find agreeable.24 It is thus a way to make ones successor 
follow the rules of ones own choice.  
  Yet another cause for participating in the system can be that 
governments do not have full control over their state. They also have 
to consider the views of it’s own population and the international 
community as a whole. Ratifying and complying with a certain 
human rights treaty can be seen as a way to exert influence in a 
specific political issue. This was for example the reason stated by 
many states that ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination to express their opposition against 
apartheid in South-Africa.25  The urge to lead by example is another 
valid explanation. Some states want to be perceived as ‘good’. By 
doing what they (and their populations) believe is right and 
complying with the treaties, they hope to influence other states into 
doing the same. This can be illustrated by Japan’s reported regard 
that their ratification of the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
primarily was intended to protect children, not in Japan, but in 
developing countries.26 
 Another explanation is what can be called the culture of human 
rights. Since the Second World War, states have, in their interactions 
with each other and with international organizations, created the 
culture of human rights. This culture, or institution, has become so 
strong that associating oneself with it leads to a sense of inclusion in 
the international arena. Opting out on the other hand makes a state 
seem backwards or even despotic. This is reinforced through the 
international media and international civil society so that states not 
                                                 
23 Heyns, C. & Viljoen, F. The impact of the United Nations human rights treaties on 
the domestic level. 2002, p. 9. 
24 Alston, P. supra note 14, p. 579. 
25 Heyns, C. and Viljoen, F., supra note 23, p. 9. 
26 Ibid. 
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fulfilling their obligations risk a loss of identity as they are excluded 
from the group of ‘modern, human rights abiding’ states. For some 
states, this identity (that of being a state that complies with human 
rights norms rather than violates them) has become so important that 
the state, in a way, characterizes itself through it. This means that the 
state cannot act contrary to its human rights obligations without 
losing part of this ‘identity’ and this regardless of what other states 
are doing or what the practical positive consequences will be.  
 A final explanation could be that states see the fulfillment of their 
obligations under the human rights treaties as a reciprocal bargain: 
that all states have more to gain from respecting their obligations 
than ignoring them. This is akin to one of the classic explanations of 
how human rights were developed in the first place. That by 
preventing other states from performing atrocities on their own 
populations, it would also be less likely that these practices would 
spread and affect the internal affairs of other states.27  
 There are thus a host of different reasons for states to live up to 
their obligations under the treaties. The one thing they all have in 
common is that states no matter what the objective a state has for 
participating, it could not be fulfilled by it simply trying to, 
unilaterally, condemn the human rights records of other states. Not 
only would it be politically dangerous for the state speaking out, 
with risks of repercussions in other fields, it would also be hard to 
maintain the image of objectivity needed for other states to actually 
take the allegation into consideration and not simply dismissing 
them as politically motivated. This has been solved by the delegation 
of authority to the treaty bodies, so that they, and not the state, can 
issue the critique, but more on delegation in the Chapter 3 below.  
2.2 The Purpose of the System 
Whenever a state ratifies28 a treaty it becomes legally bound to 
respect and protect the rights enshrined in that treaty. These 
ratifications are however only the first formal step on the road to 
actual implementation, and a signature on a paper only means so 
much. Because of this, the drafters of the conventions included a 
passage in every treaty that would establish an expert committee in 
charge of monitoring the rights enshrined in that respective 
convention.29 These expert committees are what make up the UN 
human rights treaty body system. 
                                                 
27 See, among others, Cassese, A. International Law, 2005, p. 377. 
28 Or chooses to be bound by it any other way, such as accession or succession.  
29 Except the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights that was established 
by ECOSOC.  
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 There are to date ten such treaty bodies30, each consisting of 
between ten and twenty-five experts of recognized competence in 
human rights, who are nominated and elected by the States parties 
and have a mandate that extends for four years that can be renewed. 
Half of the committee members are elected every other year to 
prevent too many new members starting at the same time. The 
experts are not paid but do their work on a voluntary basis, although 
they do receive per diems for travel and other expenses.31 
 The treaty system does not only monitor human rights situations 
but also contribute significantly to the struggle to make sure States 
comply with their legal obligations. The work they do in developing 
and elaborating the substantive content of the various treaties is also 
widely recognized.32 It has been called ‘one of the greatest 
achievements in the history of the global struggle for human 
rights’.33 And even an independent expert who, pursuant to a 
resolution by the Commission on Human Rights, issued a very 
critical report on the state of the treaty body system acknowledged 
that the system had, for all its shortcomings or weaknesses, exceeded 
the expectations that might reasonably have been held out for it.34  
 But what does these grand words mean? When evaluating a 
system it is possible to look at either its normative effects or the 
impact that it has on the human rights practices on the ground, on 
the country level. Has the treaty system actually changed the 
behavior of the states for the better or is ratification simply an empty 
gesture? The normative consequences are often vague and difficult to 
measure, which makes the effects seen on the ground a more natural 
starting point when looking at the effectiveness of the treaty body 
system.  According to one in-depth study of the impact of the work 
of the monitoring bodies35 some general conclusions can be drawn.  
 Firstly, that the importance of the system is on the increase. For 
example, human rights law forms much bigger part of the curricula 
of law schools worldwide than it has in the past. However it is still 
only rarely that the human rights norms that a State has acquiesced 
to implement are being applied in its national courts, both in monist 
and dualist countries.  
                                                 
30 The Human Rights Committee (HRC), the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (CESCR), the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
(CERD), the Committee on the Elimination of  Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW), the Committee Against Torture (CAT), the Committee on the Rights of 
the Child (CRC), The Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture (SPT), the Committee 
on Migrant Workers (CMW) the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(CRPD) and the Committee on Enforced Disappearance (CED). 
31 Lundberg, A. (red), Mänskliga rättigheter – Juridiska Perspektiv, 2010, pp.173-175. 
32 Eisenhardt, K. M., supra note 12. p. 57. 
33 Ban Ki-moon, United Nations Secretary-General, June 2012, in Pillay N., supra 
note 3, p. 7. 
34 Note by the Secretary-General, supra note 2, p. 12. 
35 Heyns, C. and Viljoen, F., supra note 23. 
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 Secondly, that the impact of the treaties has been greater through 
the recognition of the norms they contain, than through the 
international monitoring of compliance. However these two 
processes are inherently interwoven and it is at times very hard to 
find the direct causal link. The greatest impact of the treaties can be 
found where they have influenced, or form the basis of the 
constitutional provisions on human rights in a State. Finally the 
treaties have also in numerous cases prompted legislative reform. 
This is usually a consequence of either compatibility studies, (studies 
comparing the domestic legislation with the provisions of the 
treaties) or as a response to the concluding observations issued by 
the treaty bodies. There are also instances of legislation being 
changed to align with the treaties after ordinary legislative review. 
The human rights treaty system also often leads to the 
implementation of national action plans on different human rights 
issues.36 There is thus at least some basis for the praise the system 
has received, but also for the criticism.  
  The treaty system was created to be a global mechanism for the 
protection of human rights and from the onset; the focus was very 
much on achieving universal ratification.37 However this has 
changed when four new human rights treaties entered into force 
between 2003 and 2010.38 And since the ratification of the original six 
treaties have progressed very far already with each of them having 
more than 150 member States and the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child only missing two ratifications39, focus has now moved 
towards the need for implementation of the provisions. 40 This can be 
seen as a reaction to the fact that functioning of the treaty system is 
very uneven.  
 As mentioned above41, there are many sides to the system and 
some are working better than others. But the critique can be divided 
into two parts, one criticizing how the treaty bodies are functioning 
and the other complaining more on how the State parties live up to 
their obligations. The latter of the two is a problem that has been 
present during the entire existence of the treaty system and even 
though the treaty system is somewhat to blame for States non-
                                                 
36 Ibid. p. 5-19. 
37 Universal ratification was first used to mean the ratification of all the main United 
Nations human rights treaties by all UN members but has also been understood as 
containing the additional criteria of ratification of all individual complaints 
procedures. This dual use has made the term slightly confusing. 
38 The International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of their Families (2003), the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention Against Torture (2006), the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (2008) and the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons 
from Enforced Disappearance (2010). 
39 Somalia and The United States of America. 
40 Pillay, N. supra note 3, p. 16. 
41 See supra text accompanying notes 18-19.  
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compliance there is also a limit to what can be done without the 
cooperation of the States. The functioning of the treaty bodies 
themselves, on the other hand is going through a period of 
difficulties that directly relate to how the growth of the system has 
not been coupled by an increase in funding and resources. This 
difficulty has become especially apparent since 2000, when the four 
latest treaty bodies were created and the system more than doubled 
in ratifications when it went from 927 to 1.586, and increased the 
number of experts in the committees from 97 to 172.42  
 The status of the treaty system is complex and there are many 
factors enhancing the impact of the treaties on the behavior of State 
parties that are at work at the same time as factors limiting the 
impact. The traditional explanation that States are not willing to limit 
their sovereignty and therefore do not want to expose themselves to 
international supervision is still true, but at the same time this is not 
experienced in states that have a strong national constituency, that is, 
a judiciary, government officials, civil society and/or media in favor 
of the process.43  It is only natural that in a global system that 
encompasses nine different categories of human rights, there will be 
conflicting developments happening at the same time and that some 
countries, or groups of rights might experience difficulties while 
others are improving. 
 It should also be remembered that the treaty system does not 
operate in a vacuum. Not only are there several different regional 
mechanisms for the advancement of human rights, the UN Charter 
also states that one of the goals of the entire United Nations is to 
promote and encourage respect for human rights.44 There are several 
different parts of the UN system that works for this goal and the 
treaty system is but one of them. The most important other 
mechanisms are the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council 
(also called “extra-conventional mechanisms” or “Charter based 
bodies”) and the Universal Periodic Review and there are also other 
agencies whose work often relate to specific human rights, such as 
UNHCR and UNICEF, working with rights of refugees and children 
respectively.  
 When the special procedures were created there was concern that 
there would be friction and discrepancies between the two systems 
and there have even been suggested that one should be dismantled 
in favor of the other.45 Now, however such suggestions are rare and 
instead there is a growing consensus that the two systems are 
                                                 
42 Pillay, N. supra note 3, p. 17.  
43 Heyns, C. and Viljoen, F., supra note 23, p. 31 ff. 
44 UN Charter Article 1 (3). 
45 Rodley, N. United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies and Special Procedures of 
the Commission on Human Rights, 2003, p. 882 ff. 
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mutually reinforcing each other. As mentioned above46, it is 
sometimes hard to establish a causal link to determine if it has been 
the treaty system or the Special Procedures that has led to the 
improvement of a situation in a country. And if the human rights 
treaties influence the Human Rights Council to establish a Special 
Procedure for a specific right and then that Independent Expert in 
turn influences a state to improve the human rights situation then it 
matters little to the person whose rights are now being respected 
whether it was the Special Procedures or the Treaty body system that 
made it happen. As long as the situation is improving there is no 
need to argue what brokered the change.47 The same can be said for 
the Universal Periodic review, whose recommendations, to a large 
extent, build on the concluding observations of the treaty bodies.   
2.3 The Main Functions of the System 
The treaty bodies all have their own mandate, tied to their specific 
treaty, but as will be explained below, the main activities of the 
different treaty bodies are similar. They all have between two and 
four sessions every year48 that are generally held at the OHCHR 
headquarters in Geneva, although the CEDAW and HRC hold some 
of their meetings in New York. The OHCHR is also the organization 
that provides the support needed for the treaty bodies to perform 
their duties.49 
 The main task of the expert committees is monitoring the 
compliance of their respective treaty. Indeed, in some instances they 
are even called the treaty monitoring bodies. The only exception is 
the Subcommittee on the Prevention of Torture that has a purely 
preventative function. This monitoring is achieved through a number 
of functions. The main one is the mandate the committees have to 
receive and consider reports. When a State becomes party to a treaty 
they have the obligation to submit reports on a regular basis 
detailing the implementation of the treaty on the domestic level. The 
treaty bodies also issues guidelines to the states in order to help them 
with the preparation of their reports. Another task related to the 
monitoring is the drafting of General Comments. These comments 
are an interpretive tool laying down in more detail what the 
obligations arising from the treaties are. Furthermore, the committees 
                                                 
46 See supra text accompanying note 20. 
47 Heyns, C. and Viljoen, F., supra note 23, p 4. 
48 However the CED, since it was only very recently established, has only met twice 
so far, once in 2011 and once in 2012.   
49 Although when CEDAW meets in New York it is Division for the Advancement of 
Women (since 2011 a part of UN Women) that provides the services needed.  
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also organize discussions on different themes that relate to the 
various treaties.50  
 Apart from these general tasks that all the bodies share, there are 
also some functions that only some of the committees perform. Out 
of these it is the consideration of individual complaints that stands 
out. This allows for victims of human rights abuses to petition to the 
treaty body relevant to that right and enter into quasi-judicial 
proceedings to determine if there has been a violation or not and if 
the state in that case should offer compensation.51 Some treaty bodies 
also have the mandate to conduct inquires and even country visits to 
ascertain the human rights situation in a country. This can be very 
effective when it comes to convincing national authorities to stop on-
going abuses observed on site.52 The following passages will develop 
these different mechanisms a bit further. 
2.3.1 Monitoring by Means of State Reporting 
State reporting is the most widespread and established method of 
implementation of the human rights treaties at the international level 
and it is the core of the monitoring mechanisms of the treaty 
bodies.5354 It is a voluntary system based on the concept that the 
states should monitor themselves.55 This is done by sending reports 
on the human rights situation in the country to the independent and 
expert committees. This has later been complemented by reports also 
being submitted by non-state actors, so called shadow-reports.   
 All of the treaties provide for periodic reporting, generally every 
state party has to submit a report every two to five years.56 These 
                                                 
50 Factsheet 30 Rev.1: The United Nations Human Rights Treaty System: An 
Introduction to the core human rights treaties and the treaty bodies, p. 19 ff. 
51 Ibid. p. 21. 
52 Tomuschat. C., Human Rights: between idealism and reality 2008, p. 224. 
53 State reporting is common to all treaty bodies except the SPT.  
54 Tomuschat, C., supra note 52, p. 168. 
55 Bayefsky, A., supra note 17, p.5.  
56 ICERD, art. 9: the report is due within one year after the entry into force of the 
Convention for the state concerned and thereafter every two years and whenever the 
Committee so requests; ICCPR, art. 40: within one year of the entry into force of the 
Covenant and thereafter when the Committee so requests; ICESCR, art. 17: within one year 
of the entry into force of the present Covenant; CEDAW, art. 18: within one year of the 
entry into force for the state concerned and thereafter every four years and when the 
Committee so requests; CAT, art. 19: within one year after the entry into force of the 
Convention and thereafter every four years or when the Committee so requests; CRC, art. 
44 within two years of the entry into force of the Convention for the state party concerned 
and thereafter every five years; ICRMW, art. 73: Within one year after the entry into force 
of the Convention for the State Party concerned; Thereafter every five years and whenever 
the Committee so requests; CRPD, art. 35. within two years after the entry into force of the 
present Convention for the State Party concerned.  Thereafter, States parties shall submit 
subsequent reports at least every four years and further whenever the Committee so 
requests; CPED, art 29: within two years after the entry into force of this Convention for 
the State Party concerned. The Committee may also request States Parties to provide 
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reports contain information on the measures the state has adopted to 
give effect to the rights enshrined in the treaty, what progress has 
been made and any factors impeding the realization of the states 
obligation under the treaty. After submission, the committee of 
experts of the relevant treaty considers the report. This consideration 
takes place in the form of a constructive dialogue in the presence of 
state party representatives. The aim is to have a non-contentious and 
non-adversarial process, nevertheless, open criticism of the state 
parties behavior is commonplace when their human rights 
obligations have not been met. Open accusations of human rights 
violations are however rare. When the consideration of the report is 
finished the Committee issues its concluding observations on the 
report and the dialogue. These outcome-documents contain 
information on whether the treaty body considers that the state party 
is fulfilling its treaty obligations. They also include recommendations 
on what measure the State should implement in order to be in 
compliance with the human rights standards required of it.57 The 
committees also have different types of follow-up mechanisms 
aiming to ensure that the recommendations actually get acted on.58  
 The main purpose of the system is to encourage states to perform 
the tasks they have voluntarily agreed on by signing the treaties.59 
Other goals the system is meant to achieve are:  
1. to ensure that a comprehensive review of national legislation 
and administrative practices is undertaken so as to ensure 
their conformity with international norms; 
2. to guarantee that the state party continuously monitors the 
actual human rights situation and thereby become aware of 
what polices and priorities would be most helpful to 
implement and to actually implement such policies; 
3. to facilitate public scrutiny of how these government policies 
are functioning; 
4. to provide a platform on which the progress achieved in the 
human rights situation can be evaluated; 
5. to help state parties themselves to develop a better 
understanding of the challenges faced in realizing human 
rights; 
                                                                                                                            
additional information on the implementation of this Convention. (CPED has no periodic 
reporting system yet) There are also currently discussions taking place on aligning all the 
committees to receive reports at the same interval.  
57 Bayefsky A., supra note 17, pp. 5-6. 
58 The most common procedure is to request the state to submit follow-up information to 
some of the recommendations made in the concluding observations.  All treaty bodies 
except the CRC have this mandate. The CRC instead have the possibility to organize 
regional follow-up workshops. There are also other follow-up mechanisms but space does 
not permit to explain them all here.  
59 Bayefsky A., supra note 17, p.6. 
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6. to enable an exchange of information among states parties and 
the committees, in order to develop a better understanding of 
the common problems faced.60 
 
The system was developed out of the experiences of the ILO. That 
organization also used a system of periodic reporting obligations on 
the states to ensure that they honored their commitments.61 This 
followed on the non-adversarial approach of the ILO and was 
deemed preferably for the UN. In the original approach when the 
system was created there was an assumption that the examination of 
reports would lead to an interactive dialogue between the state and 
the treaty body, which in turn would lead to the progressive 
improvements in the observance of the State parties’ obligations. The 
system was therefore, in contrast to the regional systems that were 
developed roughly during the same time,62 kept of a non-judicial 
nature.63 
 The system therefore relies on a process furthering dialogue and 
the treaty bodies are only trying to ’assist’ the states in fulfilling their 
human rights obligations. However, the system is not as non-
contentious as it seems. The treaty bodies establish whether or not 
the situation in the country meet international legal obligations. And 
they also determine what measures are needed to combat the 
situation and make the violation stop.64 
 How well does the state reporting system fulfill these goals? 
There has been much criticism but is has been very varied. It can be 
seen as ranging along a continuum. On the one extreme there is the 
view that the entire system is flawed and only amounts to a 
diplomatic scheme that should be abandoned in its entirety. On the 
other end you find the opinion that acknowledges that the system is 
not flawless but still holds that it is a valuable tool in the struggle to 
implement human rights and that it is functioning as good as can be 
expected given all the constraints.65 
 Another way of looking at the effectiveness of the system is to 
examine the extent to which the state parties implement the 
recommendations contained in the concluding observations. There is 
not one answer to that question, however, since it varies very much 
from state to state. There are also different reasons that the 
recommendations are not followed. Sometimes they are not 
                                                 
60 United Nations, Report of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights – 
Third Session UN Doc. E/1989/22/(Supp), 1989, pp. 87-89;  
61 Tomuschat, C., supra note 52, pp. 167-168. 
62 The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms and the American Convention on Human Rights. 
63 Alston, P. & Crawford, J. (red.), The future of UN human rights treaty monitoring, 2000, 
pp. 1-3.  
64 Ibid. p. 335.  
65 Bayefsky A., supra note 17, p.4 
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respected because they are not detailed enough to make it practically 
possible for the state to implement them or because they do not 
contain priorities. But in many cases they are formulated in a proper 
manner and then simply ignored. However there are also instances 
when the observations are implemented and where they do have a 
significant impact on how the legal situation evolves.66 In other 
words, sometimes the system works, sometimes it does not because 
of the lack of effort or good-will on the part of the state parties and 
sometimes it does not work because of the flaws of the system. This 
last category of problems is mainly attributable to lack of funding 
and the extreme backlog of reports this has given rise to. In order to 
combat this, there has been an on-going process aimed at 
strengthening the entire treaty body system but more on this 
below.67 
 To sum up, the state reporting mechanism allows the committees 
to critically examine the human rights situation in a given country 
and hold it accountable for its shortcomings. It is, in other words, a 
context where it is the treaty body that has the power to influence the 
state rather than vice versa, this is in contrast to channels the states 
have to influence the treaty bodies examined in Chapter 3.   
2.3.2 Monitoring by Means of General 
Comments 
The treaty bodies also have the possibility to issue general comments 
or general recommendations.68 In the early days of the system, many 
states were critical to the committees having the possibility to issue 
critical reports regarding any specific country. Instead the founders 
of the system agreed on a compromise that allowed the committees 
to formulate general comments that are addressed to all states. In 
these statements the treaty bodies set out how the hold of the 
substantive provisions of the conventions should be interpreted. 
These interpretations are based on the experiences the committees 
have from both dealing with state reports and individual 
communications.69 This is not genuinely a monitoring mechanism 
but rather a way to make the monitoring performed through other 
methods more effective. 
 The general comments also provide general guidance on how the 
state should submit information on specific articles of the treaties.70 
Other topics dealt with by the comments are cross cutting issues. 
                                                 
66 Heyns, C. and Viljoen, F., supra note 23, p. 26. 
67 See infra chapter 2.3.  
68 All treaty bodies use the term ’general comments’ except CERD and CEDAW who 
prefers ’general recommendations’. SPT, CRPD and CED have not yet issued any.  
69 Alston, P. & Crawford, J. (red.), supra note 63, p. 257.  
70 Factsheet 30 Rev.1, supra note 50, p. 37. 
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This has for example included comments on the role of human rights 
institutions and rights of minorities, issues that are relevant to all the 
monitoring bodies.71  
 Through the general comments the treaty bodies have a 
possibility to communicate their views on a specific right, article or 
subject, directly to the community of state parties. Not surprisingly 
the first general comment issued by both CESCR and HRC were 
directed towards getting the states to fulfill their reporting 
obligations.72 This channel of communication needs not to be 
forgotten when examining the relationship between the state parties 
and the treaty bodies. 
 In this context the days of general or thematic discussion also 
deserves to be mentioned. This is used by a number of committees 
and usually takes place during one of the days of certain sessions.73 
Normally they deal with a particular theme and are open not only to 
the state parties but also to other UN partners, NGOs and individual 
experts. This forum also provides for an opportunity of the relevant 
actors to try to influence each other.  
2.3.3 Monitoring by Means of Individual 
Communications 
As mentioned above74 the UN treaty body system is not of a judicial 
nature. However, there is one element of it that works in a somewhat 
quasi-judicial manner: the individual communications procedure. 
This is an optional procedure that is provided for by many of the 
human rights treaties, established through two different methods: 
the ICCPR, CEDAW, CRPD each have an optional protocol and any 
state that is party to both the treaty and the protocol recognizes the 
competence of the committee to receive and consider 
communications from individuals claiming that their rights have 
been violated by the state;75 the CAT, ICERD and CED follow a 
different approach where a state becomes part of the 
communications procedure by making a ‘necessary declaration’ 
provided for in the treaties.76  
                                                 
71 For a complete list of all General Comments issued to date, see UN Doc. 
HRI/GEN/1/REV.9(Vol.1) and (Vol.2). 
72 CESCR General Comment 1: Reporting by state parties, in UN Doc. 
HRI/GEN/1/REV.9(Vol.I) pp. 1-3; CCPR General Comment No. 01: Reporting Obligation, 
in UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/REV.9(Vol.I) p. 173.   
73 Such discussions have been held by HRC, CESCR, CERD, CRC, CMW and CRPD.  
74 See supra text accompanying notes 56-58. 
75 ICCPR-OP 1 art. 1, OP-CEDAW art. 1, OP-CRPD art. 1. There is also an Optional 
Protocol to ICESCR that will establish a communications procedure when ten states have 
ratified it. To date only two ratifications are missing.  
76 CAT art. 22, ICERD art. 14 and CED art. 31. The ICMW also provides for such a 
declaration to be made under art. 77 but will only be established when such declarations 
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 Anybody who can claim that the rights given to him or her by 
any of the mentioned human rights treaties is allowed to complain 
before the respective committee. The only caveat is that the state 
allegedly responsible for the violation must be a party to both the 
treaty and the optional protocol (or have issued the necessary 
declaration).77 Also third parties can file communications on behalf 
of alleged victims provided they have their written consent, or if it is 
justifiable that the third party is acting without such consent.78 
 After a petition is filed a process which has some judicial features 
follows. The relevant committee first notifies the concerned state of 
the alleged violation and gives it six months to respond.79 The 
committee then examines if the communication is admissible or not, 
for example, domestic remedies must have been exhausted before 
turning to the treaty bodies. If the petition is deemed admissible the 
committee then convenes in closed session to consider the issue at 
hand.80 After such consideration, the committee in question will 
issue its ‘views’ on the matter. This view consists of the treaty body’s 
interpretation of the relevant part of the convention and their 
conclusion on whether the merits of the case constitute a violation of 
the convention by the State party or not.81 Views are directed directly 
to particular states, which make them somewhat adjudicatory, in 
contrast to the general comments mentioned above which are 
directed to all state parties.82  
 The final views cannot be enforced, so even though it might be 
considered quasi-judicial there is no agency a victim can turn to with 
the final decision and expect compensation. However, in many cases, 
the states parties do follow the recommendations of the committees 
and award remedies to the complainants.83 
 As mentioned above84, it was important not to give too much of a 
judicial framing to the system. Even now when delivering decisions 
on individual petitions, they are phrased as ‘views’ and the petitions 
to the committees are known as communications, not complaints. In 
practice there is no difference between the concepts but the use of the 
term ‘communication’ has made it easier to gain acceptance for the 
                                                                                                                            
have been made by ten states. At the moment only two states, Uruguay and Mexico, have 
made such declarations.  
77 ICCPR-OP 1 art. 1, OP-CRPD art. 1 (2). the other conventions have similar provisions 
78 OP-CEDAW art. 2. Used analogously by the other committees as well.  
79 OP-ICCPR 1 art. 4 the other conventions have similar provisions 
80 OP-ICCPR 1 art. 5 the other conventions have similar provisions 
81 Alston, P. & Crawford, J. (red.), supra note 63, p. 257-8. 
82 See subchapter 2.1.2. However, even though the general comments do not follow a 
procedure akin to a judicial one, they are still based on the experiences the committees have 
of consideration of the state reports and specific cases and do contain some elements of a 
judgment, only not directed to a specific state but to all. This, in a sense, makes them 
somewhat judicatory.  
83 Factsheet 30 Rev.1, supra note 50, p. 25 
84 See supra text accompanying notes 56-58. 
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mechanism among the state parties, since it does not carry with it the 
more hostile implication of a charge.85 
 So what is the objective of this procedure? Since the state 
reporting mechanism takes such a panoramic view of the human 
rights situation it is not uncommon for things to be left out. This 
makes the individual communications an important complement. 
There have, for example, been cases where inconsistencies in the 
domestic legislation of a country were not discovered during the 
state reporting, but later found to violate the convention through the 
individual communications procedure.86  
 In theory there can be three possible positive outcomes from 
individual communications: primarily, an individual whose rights 
are deemed to have been violated, may receive compensation from 
the state that has wronged her and the violation be stopped; 
secondarily, the committee finding a violation against one 
complainant might not only result in benefits for her, but also to 
others in a similar situation through changes in domestic legislation 
or practices; and tertiarily, taken together, views can be used as 
evidence of systematic and widespread violation of specific rights in 
a particular state.87  
 How well the system performs these functions and what the 
precise legal significance of the views is, is not entirely agreed upon. 
One position is that they are not legally binding in a formal sense but 
that they are an authoritative ascertainment of law that obliges the 
state parties, through general international law and the provisions of 
the treaty, to eliminate any violations.88 Another view, put forward 
by F. Pocar, a former chairperson to the HRC, builds on a reading of 
the convention as a whole. It entails that even though the provision 
ICCPR-OP 1 art. 5(4) only states that the view shall be forwarded to 
the concerned state it must be read together with ICCPR art. 2(3) 
stating that each party to the convention undertakes to ensure that 
                                                 
85 Tomuschat, C., supra note 52, p. 193.  
86 See case No. 196/1985 (J. Gueye et al. v. France) Report of the Human Rights 
Committee, UN GAOR 44th Session., Suppl. No. 40, p. 189 ff. UN Doc A/44/40 (1989) 
where a violation was found because of discriminatory practices regarding pensions to 
soldiers without French nationality, something that was not brought up during the state 
reporting procedure. Report of the Human Rights Committee, UN GAOR 43rd Session, 
Suppl. No. 40 para. 376 ff. at page 86 ff, UN Doc A/43/40 (1988).  See also case No. 
265/1987 (Voulanne v. Finland) in UN Doc. A/44/40 (1989) p. 249-257. 
87 Müllerson, R., ’The Efficacy of the Individual Complaint Procedures: The Experience of 
CCPR, CERD, CAT and ECHR’, in Monitoring Human Rights in Europe (eds. A. Bload et 
al.), Dordrecht, 1993, p. 27.  
88 This was said regarding the status of views coming from the HRC, but is applicable to all 
views. Herndl, K., ’Zur Frage des rechtligen Status der Entscheidungen eines 
Staatsgemeinschaftsorgans: Die ”Views” des Menschenrechtsausschusses’ in Völkerrech 
zwischen normativern Anspruch und politischer Realität: Festschrift für Karl Zemanek zum 
65. Geburtstag (eds. K. Ginther et al.) Berlin, 1994, pp. 203, 212 (translation by Iwasawa, 
in Alston, P. & Crawford, J. (red.), supra note 55, p. 258. 
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any person whose rights are violated shall have an effective remedy. 
This, according to Pocar, leads to the only possible conclusion that if 
the HRC discovers a violation of any of the rights of the HRC then 
the state party responsible for that violation is, under that same 
covenant, obliged to remedy that violation.89 A third approach is that 
the legal importance of the system is less important than its practical 
effects, and that in that regard, it is only as a way to remind states, of 
inconsistencies in their domestic legal systems that may or may not 
lead to change, that the procedure has importance.90  This role can of 
course also be played by the state reporting procedure mentioned 
above, but states might be more susceptible to change when the 
consequences of their practices for specific individuals are made 
clear.  
 The individual communications procedure is not the only 
mechanism of this type. There is also a process dealing with state-to-
state complaints. It varies slightly depending on which committee is 
concerned but HRC, CERD, CEDAW, CAT, Committee on Migrant 
Workers and Committee on Enforced Disappearances all have some 
way of resolving disputes between states.91 However, none of these 
have ever been used.  
 Individual communications is thus yet another way through 
which the state parties and the treaty bodies communicate with each 
other, albeit be it only concerning particular cases. It differs also from 
the general comments in that it is a two-way communication in 
which the states have an opportunity to put forward their opinions 
on how a specific obligation arising from the conventions should be 
interpreted. The committee, however, always gets the last word. This 
makes the procedure more akin to that of state reporting.  
2.3.4 Monitoring by Means of Fact-Finding 
Another mechanism used to monitor the human rights situation in 
the state parties is to initiate inquiries. This procedure is only 
available to CAT, CEDAW and the Subcommittee on the Prevention 
of Torture. The two first mentioned follow an almost identical 
procedure while the third, whose very raison d’etre is to perform 
country visits, has slightly different working methods. This chapter 
will first deal with the two original treaty bodies and then continue 
with the subcommittee.  
 For both CAT and CEDAW their ability to initiate inquiries begin 
in situations where they have received reliable information giving 
                                                 
89 Pocar, F. Valeur Juridique des Constatations du Comite des Droits de l’Homme, La, 
1992, pp. 129–130. 
90 Müllerson, R. supra note 87, p. 27. 
91 ICCPR arts. 41-43, ICERD arts. 11-13, CEDAW art. 29, CAT arts. 21 & 30, CMW arts. 
74 & 92, CED arts. 32 & 42. 
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well-founded indications either that torture is being systematically 
practiced (for CAT) or (for CEDAW) of grave or systematic violations 
of the rights set forth in the convention.92  However, the conventions 
do not provide whom it is that shall that provide this information. 
This has lead to NGOs taking an active role and they are often the 
ones to inform the committees.93 
 The main features of the inquiry procedure is that they are 
confidential and that the committees to the greatest extent possible 
are trying to pursue cooperation with the concerned state. The 
process is as follows: after the committee receives the information 
mentioned in the last paragraph, it invites the state to cooperate in 
the examination of this information. After that it may designate one 
or more of its members to make a confidential inquiry into the 
situation and to report back to the committee. This inquiry may, if 
the state agrees to, include a visit to the country itself. The committee 
then examines the results and transmits them to the concerned state, 
accompanied with any comments or recommendations they find 
relevant.  The committee may then issue a summary report of the 
results of the inquiry to be included in its annual report, but only if 
the state concerned agree to lift the confidentiality.94 The state parties 
also have the possibility of opting out of the inquiry system by 
issuing declarations that exempt them from this mandate of the 
committees.95 
 Since country visits is one of the main activities of the 
Subcommittee on the Prevention of Torture, and since they work 
purely preventative, their approach is slightly different.96 By 
ratifying the Otional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment all State parties 
obligates themselves to receive visits to any place where persons are 
deprived of their liberty.97 There is thus no need for any specific 
information to arise in order for a visit to be motivated. The mandate 
of what can be done during these visits are also more detailed when 
it comes to the Subcommittee on the Prevention of Torture  in 
comparison with the other treaty bodies.98 
 There is, however, one aspect that both systems share: they do 
not have the long delays inherent to them as the individual 
communications procedure or the state reports. Instead they can 
work in a more preventative fashion. This is mainly done through 
                                                 
92 CAT art. 20, CEDAW art 8-9.  
93 Tomuschat, C., supra note 52, p. 226.  
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96 Fact File on the UN Subcommittee on Prevention of Torture and Other Forms of Ill-
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contact with officials and authorities at the grass-root level and often 
has a more direct effect on the concrete insufficiencies of the state 
practices leading to human rights violations on the ground.99 This 
meeting between representatives of the committees and those of the 
state is different from the ones taking place in Geneva or New York 
where it is mostly high-level officials in the meetings.  
 It is a channel of communications where again it is the committee 
that has the upper hand, even though the state still has the possibility 
of denying access, either to the country as a whole or to the areas 
where the gravest violations occur, something that is not uncommon. 
Still it is a situation where it is the representatives from the 
committees that have the possibility of influencing the behavior of 
the state officials on the ground while the officials themselves have 
hardly any possibility of affecting the committees’ work.    
2.4 The Strengthening Process of the 
UN Treaty Body System 
The treaty body system is currently going through a period of 
difficulties. It is suffering from both under-funding and lack of 
cooperation from the state parties. As of April 2012 there were 626 
state reports that had not yet been submitted.100 But even with this 
large number of reports overdue, the system is still struggling to 
keep up with the ones that are submitted. The treaty bodies have 
backlogs amounting to 281 state reports that are waiting to be 
treated. 101 This means that even the states that do cooperate and 
submit on time have to wait years and years for their reports to be 
considered. The monitoring bodies that receive individual 
communications suffer similar problems when it comes to this 
procedure. The HRC has now an average time of three and a half 
years from when a case is registered until a final decision arrives.102 
That this is a problem for a body set to guarantee, among other 
things, the right to a fair trial without undue delay103, goes without 
saying. 
 These are not new problems, however, and efforts to combat 
them have been going on since 1997 when the independent expert 
Philip Alston issued his milestone report on how to enhance the 
long-term effectiveness of the UN human rights system.104 In 2002 
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100 Pillay, N. supra note 3, p. 23. 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid. 
103 ICCPR art. 14 (3) (c).  
104 Note by the Secretary General: Effective functioning of bodies established pursuant to 
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the Secretary General issued a report105 on strengthening of the entire 
UN system, which also contained a section on how the treaty bodies 
could be made more effective. The former High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, Ms. Louise Arbour, worked actively to reform the 
system and published a concept paper on a unified standing treaty 
body, to replace the ones already in place.106 It contained many bold 
proposals aiming at solving the structural problems of the system 
but was not adopted. One of the main reasons put forward for the 
failure of this proposal is that it was developed by the OHCHR on 
their own, without sufficient consultations with the treaty bodies and 
the member states.107 This led to a severe backlash once the report 
was finally put forward and many stakeholders felt left out of the 
process.  The concept paper did, however make the treaty bodies 
themselves more actively engaged in improving the system. This 
continued through Inter-Committee Meetings and Chairpersons 
Meetings, where representatives from the various treaty bodies meet 
and exchange working methods in order to harmonize their 
procedures.  
 This harmonization on the initiative of the monitoring bodies has 
lead to efficiency gains for the entire system but the huge backlogs 
and the problems of states not reporting on time did not go away. 
Therefore, the current High Commissioner for Human Rights, Ms. 
Navanethem Pillay, initiated her own strengthening process in 2009. 
This time, the OHCHR tried to learn from past mistakes and made 
the reform process a very inclusive one. Informal consultations were 
held with states on several occasions108, as well as with the treaty 
body members109 and civil society and national human rights 
institutions.110 The High Commissioner has also throughout the 
process encouraged all actors to submit their own proposals for 
change. In 2012 she issued her report on Treaty Body 
Strengthening111 in which a host of different proposals were put 
forward. These proposals, including a comprehensive reporting 
calendar, a simplified reporting process and guidelines on 
independence of the members of the treaty bodies, will now be 
considered by an open ended inter-governmental working group, 
currently in session in New York, that will submit their conclusion 
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and their proposals of reform to the General Assembly for a final 
decision.112  
 The HC report is not a take it or leave it proposition, but rather 
contains a number of different proposals that, although mutually 
reinforcing, can be accepted individually. It remains to be seen which 
of the High Commissioners proposals will make it into the end 
document of the state-working group. 
 
                                                 
112 Inter Governmental Working group established through GA Res. A/66/L.37, 16 
February 2012.  
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3 Independence now and 
tomorrow  
Historically states have been the only actors with the authority to 
interpret what their international obligations are. It is only a 
relatively new phenomenon that other actors have been empowered 
to decide what the state of the law is. The UN treaty bodies are one 
such actor with a mandate to tell states what their obligations under 
international human rights are and issue recommendations. This is a 
development that not all states have been eager to accept. It is 
therefore important to determine if the states, in establishing the 
treaty bodies, really have given up their control, or if the states still 
retain some tools to influence the decisions of the treaty bodies, that 
is, to limit their independence.  
 In trying to determine the independence of any actor there are, 
however, some ontological problems that needs to be acknowledged. 
The first problem, as mentioned in the introduction, is to determine 
what is meant by independence. Only after that has been defined is it 
possible to examine if there is a possibility to determine its scope. 
This paper uses the concept of independence from, meaning how 
autonomous an actor is to act according to its own preferences 
without having to adapt to the will of others. However this definition 
carries with it some empirical problems. It is not very easy to 
measure what the preference of any given actor really is and even if 
we can measure that we also have to compare this to the preferences 
of another actor, the one that wants to influence the first. To measure 
the independence empirically we thus need to distinguish the 
difference in preferences and then compare outcomes to see if they 
follow the wishes of the former or the latter. This can be done, indeed 
it has been done, but it is best suited when examining actors that 
regularly produce outputs that can easily be compared to the 
preferences of others.113 
 The treaty bodies, however, are not very well suited for this type 
of studies. The ones that accept individual communications could 
perhaps be studied to compare the ‘views’ of the committee with the 
desired outcome of the state party concerned, but this is only a small 
part of the whole treaty body system, and the main outcome, the 
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concluding observations, are not the product of an adversarial 
procedure where two disagreeing parties are pitted against each 
other. Studying them would therefore not provide much information 
regarding their independence.  
 If empirical studies cannot provide an answer to our research 
question, what is our next step? Should we give up and just accept 
that the ontological obstacles are so great that it is impossible to 
know how independent or not the monitoring bodies really are? Or 
is there another way to look at it? In other field than law, scholars 
often turn to theoretical frameworks to help explain the world when 
it proves hard to measure empirically.  
 One such framework is that of Principal – Trustee theory (P-T 
theory). The following explains how this framework can be used to 
shed some light upon the autonomy of the treaty bodies. 
3.1 Principal-Trustee Theory as a Tool 
to Understand Independence 
Principal-Trustee theory is a framework that builds on the rational 
choice tradition that helps explain and understand delegation.  In the 
context of this thesis, the P-T theory is relevant in that it can offer 
predictions and perspective about the autonomy of the treaty bodies 
(the trustee) and the influence the state parties to the treaties (the 
principal) exerts on them.  
 The states are in this thesis considered as the principal 
collectively because it was through their drafting and ratifying of the 
human rights treaties that the committees were created.114 It is also 
the member states that have the ability to amend the treaties, which 
in this instance fills the function of a delegation contract.115 They also 
provide the financial resources to the treaty bodies.116 The experts 
serving as committee members are also appointed and re-appointed 
by the states parties to the respective conventions.117 It is thus the 
member states that control who gets appointed as experts in a treaty 
body, and they also control how much funding that body has at its 
disposal. For the purposes of this thesis the collective made up by all 
the state parties are, as stated above, therefore the Principal, while all 
the treaty bodies together make up the Trustee. The third criterion 
that defines a P-T relationship is that there must be a beneficiary. In 
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this case it is the population of the world. It is for their sake the treaty 
bodies exist and it is they who are supposed to be guaranteed the 
rights of the different treaties. In the wider sense they are also 
represented by the international community of NGO’s and civil 
society organizations. 
 In the following the framework of Principal Trustee relationships 
is explained. First comes a short segment of how the theory was 
developed, followed by a more detailed explanation of the P-T 
approach. Since no framework is without its problems, next follows 
an outline of the critique directed towards the theory and finally 
comes a part describing what the theory can teach us about 
independence. 
3.1.1 Development of Principal-Trustee 
theory 
So what is P-T theory? It is a theory that was developed from a 
broader structure called Principal-Agent theory. The trustee is in 
reality a type of agent, a subcategory if you will. Here follows 
therefore an explanation of the broader concept of agents and how it 
came to be developed into the more specific term trustees. This 
background is necessary to understand in order to be able to use P-T 
theory to offer explanations and insights into the independence of 
the treaty bodies.  
 Principal-Agent theory was first used in economics and political 
science to help explain and understand the commonly observed 
phenomena of delegation.  It builds on the framework of rational 
choice theory of both domestic and international politics. At the 
domestic level the actors are mainly voters or legislators while at the 
international level, it primarily concerns the activities of states. These 
actors are assumed to be instrumentally rational in that they want to 
achieve the largest gains possible for as low a cost possible. In order 
to do this they sometimes delegate authority or power to other 
actors, called agents. These agents can in that way perform activities 
that had earlier been performed by the principals. However, there 
are several risks with this delegation and the principals therefore try 
to tailor the delegation in order to avoid them. These risks include 
the fear that the agent will not be sufficiently committed to its tasks 
and that the information given and received will not be relevant or 
sufficient.118  
 The main problem, however, is that the agent’s interests will 
never correspond perfectly to those of the principal and that this will 
lead to situations where the agent acts according to his or her self-
interest instead of the wishes of the principal. For example in 
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business the main goal of an agent running a regional office is not to 
make money for the principal at headquarters but to make money for 
herself. This will sometimes lead her to acting in ways that are not 
intended by the principal. This is called agency ‘slack’ or ‘losses’ and 
is defined as behavior that the principal has not, or would not, 
approve of.119 Agency slack is a natural consequence of differences of 
interest and exists in any P-A relationship and principals have 
always tried to come up with ways in order to limit it.  However 
principals sometimes gives agents a certain amount of discretion to 
decide matters for themselves. This discretion should not be 
confused with unwanted agency slack.  
 P-A theory was developed in order to better understand these 
relationships and to help principals shape the delegation contracts in 
such a way as to minimize agency slack. It has now risen to be the 
main perspective from which to analyze the behavior of states and 
the agents to whom they delegate power.120 The essence of principal 
agent theory is to draw attention to issues of hierarchical control 
when it comes to information asymmetry and conflicts of interest.121 
Since any attempt to limit agency slack is also an attempt to limit the 
autonomy of an agent to act according to its own preferences, there is 
an obvious use for this theory when trying to determine how 
independent an actor is. The theory has also been used when it 
comes to international organizations122, courts123 and the EU124125 and 
is also starting to be applied to the field of human rights.126 There are 
however aspects of that the P-A theory does not take into 
consideration. This is why a more specific category of agents, called 
trustees was developed, as explained below.  
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3.1.2 Moving from Agents to Trustees  
One of the criticisms directed towards the Principal-Agent theory is 
that it does not take third party actors into consideration. The 
relationship between the principal and the agent is strictly 
hierarchical but in reality it is often the case that the agents are 
influenced, not only by their principals, but also by others.127 
 Building on this criticism; Majone came up with the theory that 
there are two different motives why a principal would give up 
power to another entity. He called this the “two logics of delegation”. 
The first is to reduce decision-making costs and gain efficiency, and 
the other is to enhance credibility. The former delegates to agents 
that have expertize that is relevant for the type of policy the principal 
wants to implement through the agent. In this case it is mostly 
executive functions that are delegated and they are accompanied by 
quite strict control mechanisms. In the latter case power is delegated 
to someone that is then deliberately separated from the principal. 
Majone called this latter category, where credibility is the main aim, 
fiduciary delegation, and the classic type, agency delegation. In 
agency delegation the main aim of the principal is to find an agent 
that is closely aligned to herself as possible and to find the best ways 
to control the agent. Since fiduciary delegation is aimed at gaining 
credibility and pleasing a third party, a puppet agent would not 
help. Instead the optimal agent is one whose preferences differ 
systematically from those of the principal.128  
 This fiduciary delegation was further developed by Alter into 
what she called Principal-Trustee theory.129 Her theory replaces the 
somewhat cumbersome term fiduciary delegation, with delegation to 
trustees.  A trustee is different from a ‘true’ agent in that the 
delegation, as was the case for fiduciary delegation, is motivated by 
gains in legitimacy and not in efficiency.130  
  In the original principal - agent relationship the true agent is 
acting only for the benefit of herself and the benefit of the principal. 
And there is only agency slack when these two do not correspond. 
Under the Principal–Trustee framework on the other hand, the agent 
is also acting to serve a third party, a so-called beneficiary. It does 
not matter who this beneficiary is, only that it exists. The relationship 
is thus more complex than in the case of true agents, where it is 
purely hierarchical with the principal on top and the agent below. In 
a P-T relationship the principal is still above the agent (the trustee), 
in the hierarchical sense, but both are trying to convince the audience 
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of the third party that they are acting in a legitimate way. The 
beneficiary therefore binds the trustee; it cannot blindly follow the 
principal’s wishes without creating damages to its own credibility. 
The same applies for the principal, for often the trustee is viewed as a 
better decision maker by the beneficiary, which would make 
instructions from them principal look like ‘political interference’.131   
 To sum up, a trustee is defined as an agent that is 1) selected 
because of their personal and or professional reputation, 2) given 
authority to make meaningful decisions according to the trustee’s 
best judgment or the trustee’s professional criteria, and 3) is taking 
these decisions on behalf of a beneficiary.132  
 There has been some discussion on whether P-T theory really is 
that different from P-A theory. Alter and Alston favor a dichotomy 
while Polack does not.  Polack believes that understanding the 
delegation to a ‘true’ agent also help us shed light on the delegation 
to a trustee, since many share motives and behavior. He also finds it 
hard to draw an exact line between the two types of agents.133  This is 
echoed by Hawkins and Jacoby who claim that the differences 
between agents and trustees sometimes change and that they might 
grow to look alike. The more agents develop relationships with their 
constituency, creating a personal or office-based reputation for 
authority, the more the agent becomes like a trustee and there is 
therefore always a grey zone where it is difficult to determine 
whether an actor is a trustee or an agent.134 
 But in the context of the treaty body system, it does not matter if 
there is a grey area where it is hard to determine if an agent is a true 
agent or a trustee. The treaty bodies are doubtlessly found in the 
second category. They are definitely elected because their personal 
and professional reputation, it is even stated in the treaties that they 
shall be of high moral standard and with recognized competence in 
their field.135 They are given authority to make decisions according to 
their own best judgment. It is the experts themselves that formulate 
the concluding observations and other outcomes from the treaty 
body system. And finally, they are taking these decisions on the 
behalf of a beneficiary. It is not for the sake of the member states 
themselves that the monitoring bodies work. As stated in the 
preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it is for the 
benefit for “all peoples and all nations”, indeed even for “every 
                                                 
131 Ibid., p. 40. 
132  Alston, P. supra note 14, p. 634; Alter, K. J.,  supra note 15, p. 39. 
133 Pollack, M. A., supra note 115, p. 10. 
134 Hawkins, D. G. & Jacoby, W. How agents matter in Hawkins, G. D., et al (eds.) 
supra note 117. 
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individual and every organ of society”.136 They therefore fulfill all 
the criteria that define a trustee.  
3.1.3 Critique directed against Principal-
Trustee Theory 
In order to understand the critique that has been directed towards P-
T theory we need to remember what the purpose of the theory is. 
This thesis concerns itself with the independence of the treaty bodies. 
If the P-T framework helps us understand or determine this 
independence then it is a good tool that should be used. If not, then it 
should not. Therefore it is only critique that brings to doubt the 
theories usefulness in this regard that needs to be seriously 
responded to.  
 In the following the most common critiques will be explained 
and then responded to. Some of these critiques were originally 
directed towards ‘true’ agents and not trustees but they are still 
relevant since both agent and trustees are based on the same 
theoretical framework.  
  One such criticism, which is really no more than a 
misconception is that agents, in the interests of the effectiveness of 
their own organizations, prefer not to anger the principal in order to 
keep their discretion.137 That they, even when they have other 
preferences than their principals, would still adapt to those wishes so 
that they would not force the principal to step in and overturn their 
decisions or revoke their delegation contract. But, as Alter notes in 
the context of international courts, professional norms or values 
might be just as, or even more, important than the desire to please 
the principal. She found that often the courts would rather openly go 
against the principal only to have their decisions, sometimes 
humiliatingly, overturned. The assumption that agent seek to avoid 
sanctions at all cost is therefore not always true, especially when it 
comes to the judicial context. An agent or a trustee, might prefer to 
have their decisions overturned by their principal, (the legislature) 
than to adopt a decision that is, or appears to be, colored by political 
considerations138  
 Another type of critique is directed towards the ontological and 
the empirical side of P-T theory. It holds that it does not matter how 
theoretically stringent or internally consistent the P-T model is if it 
cannot systematically and correctly identify why and how principals 
delegate or how independent the agents are after the delegation has 
taken place. It claims that the theory does not help us understand the 
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real reason why principals delegate, or how autonomous the trustees 
become and that other theories are better employed instead. 
Sociological institutionalist or constructivist theories might be more 
useful.  Since this thesis concerns itself with independence, we must 
look at if other theories are better suited to explain and determine the 
autonomy of a trustee, in our case the treaty bodies.  
 There is also the constructionist standpoint, that P-T theory (or 
any rationalist theory) is “ontologically blind” to the most important 
factors influencing behavior.  For example some scholars hold that 
international organizations are bureaucracies which entails that there 
behavior cannot be simply predicted by a theory that builds on 
preferences since there is not one set of preferences common for all 
working in the bureaucracy. Instead there are common values shared 
internally that instead needs to be taken into consideration in order 
to understand how they act.139 However it has been hard for these 
constructionists to show empirically that this blindness, or the factors 
that rationalist theories do not consider, really changes the results of 
the studies.140 
 It should also be noted that P-T theory is a rationalist mid-level 
theory, and as any such theory it is compatible with many other 
rationalist mid-level theories, so it can be just one out of many 
building blocks. The aim of this paper is not to come up with one 
grand theory that can explain everything, just to look at the 
independence through this perspective in order to get some insights 
that so far have been overlooked.  
3.2 Using Principal-Trustee Theory to 
Determine Independence 
What does P-T theory tell us about the member states possibilities to 
influence the treaty bodies? It tells us that there are four main ways 
for the principal to sanction the trustee when it is not happy with its 
behavior. These are: A) to fire the trustee, B) to not-re-appoint the 
trustee when the tenure of the contract runs out, C) to rewrite the 
terms of the delegation contract and D) to change the budget the 
trustee has to work with.141 These are the main tools a principal has 
to limit the independence of a trustee and they are dealt with in 
detail in the following two subchapters. First some other instruments 
of influence deserve mention. 
 Another tool often used to limit the independence of ‘true’ 
agents is threats. This is, for a number of reasons, however not quite 
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as effective when it comes to getting trustees to stay in line with the 
principal’s wishes.142 The first is that in a P-T relationship there is 
always a beneficiary watching. The international organizations 
representing the populations that the treaty bodies are set to protect 
would react very negatively on threats coming from the member 
states trying to influence the behavior of the treaty bodies. This 
would lead to state issuing the threat being painted in a very 
negative light in the international arena and other adverse 
consequences in the principals’ relation to the beneficiary. This is 
especially true if the beneficiary is approving of the actions of the 
trustee the principal is trying to threaten.  
 For a threat to be effective, it also needs to be credible. In this 
context, and any context where the principal consists of a large group 
of actors, this is always a problem. The disgruntled state must first 
convince the other member states that the trustee was indeed out of 
line before being able to put some strength behind its words. The 
third reason threats are often useless after a trustee has been 
appointed are her strong professional norms.143  These were in fact 
one of the reasons the trustee was appointed.144 As long as a trustee 
believes that she is acting within her mandate, these norms often 
makes her more likely to take the fall than to bow down to pressure. 
It therefore seems the treaty bodies are quite protected against 
threats from the member states. 
 Another way the principal might try to influence the trustee that 
P-T theory highlights is the use of legitimacy and rhetorical 
politics.145 This is a channel of influence unique to the principal-
trustee relationship. It does not exist in the case of ‘true’ agents since 
it is dependent on the beneficiary, the third party for whose sake the 
trustee was established. It is also unique since it provides for a two-
way line of influence; both the principal and the trustee can try to use 
this instrument to try to influence the other. This is because both are 
dependent on remaining on a good footing with the beneficiary. This 
is however a very fickle way of imposing ones will, since it is 
dependent on shaping popular opinion. If the state collective can 
convince the beneficiary (say through the international NGOs) that 
the treaty bodies are not useful or not doing what they are supposed 
to do, they would have obtained a very important tool that could be 
used to impose a new regime. The same goes for the treaty bodies, 
their recommendations are only as powerful as other actors make 
them. If they are able to convince, for instance, the civil society in a 
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country, to continue to apply pressure on the state regarding a 
specific recommendation, the state is a much more likely to change 
its practices. This is unfortunately quite difficult to measure 
empirically. One way would be to examine how the views of the 
treaty bodies and the states are being forwarded and used by third 
parties. This would give an indication of how well the actors are able 
to use the beneficiary to strengthen their respective positions. This 
however, falls outside the scope of this thesis.  
 The main instrument, available to the state collective, of limiting 
the independence of the treaty bodies remain the four sanctioning 
methods mentioned earlier: to fire, or not re-appoint the trustee, 
changing the terms of delegation and cutting the budget. In the 
following they are examined in the context of limiting the 
independence of the treaty body system as a whole, and then how 
they affect the individual treaty body experts. 
  
3.3 Independence of the Treaty Bodies 
as a Whole 
For the treaty body in its entirety it is changes in the budget that is 
the largest threat to its independence. The other three methods of 
sanctioning rather concern the individual members. This chapter will 
therefore examine what possibilities the state collective (the 
principal) has to use the budget to influence the treaty bodies (the 
trustee). 
 P-T theory posits that cutting the budget of the trustee can 
provide the principal with significant political leverage to make sure 
the trustee does not stray too far away from the course approved by 
the principal. When applying this theory to the treaty body system 
one must first look at the legal foundations of the system. All 
monitoring bodies were created to be independent. The treaties 
contain provisions stating that the members of the committees shall 
serve in their personal capacity.146 They are not there to represent 
their own member states, or any other side-interest. The treaties also 
state that the treaty bodies are independent to decide their working 
methods for themselves with but a few minor caveats.147 For example 
the ICCPR, the CAT and the Optional Protocol to the CAT all contain 
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minimum rules on how many of their respective members need to be 
present for a decisions to be valid.  
 However this legal authority to decide how to work does not 
automatically mean that the treaty bodies also have the practical 
possibility of achieving it in reality. In order to function properly the 
committees require funding. This was taken into account in the 
original treaties. The wording differs slightly between the covenants 
but in all of them it is stated that the Secretary General of the UN 
shall provide the committee with the necessary staff and facilities to 
allow the monitoring body to effectively perform its functions.148 
Since the creation of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (OHCHR) in 1993 it is this office that has been responsible for 
providing these resources. The treaty bodies do not have any 
independent budgets but are only given what is allocated to them by 
the OHCHR. In order to determine the principal’s, the member 
states’, possibility to use the budget as a tool for influencing the 
treaty bodies, we must take a closer look into the budget of the 
system. 
 The budget of the OHCHR comes from the general budget of the 
UN (40.9 percent as of 2011) and from voluntary contributions (59.1 
percent), mainly from member states.149 Out of these funds only 7.4 
percent goes to the Treaty Body Division. The funds coming from the 
general budget of the UN is earmarked to very specific posts and 
every activity need to be carefully cost-assessed before the General 
Assembly can approve any funds for it. This goes down to the level 
of how much money can be spent on translation of documents, on 
interpreters for specific meetings and every position employed by 
the treaty division.150 The funds coming from voluntary donations to 
the treaty body division are not as fixed. Less than 5 percent are 
earmarked for specific projects.151 But the majority of the funds used 
by the treaty body system still have to go through the official UN 
budget process.  
 The main example of how the General Assembly’s control of the 
budget affects the work of the treaty bodies is meeting time. The 
treaties vary when it comes to how often the committees shall meet. 
The HRC, the CAT and the Subcommittee on the Prevention of 
Torture are explicitly given the authority to decide on their own on 
how often to meet.152  Despite this, getting more meeting time for the 
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committees has been extremely hard. Since all the committees have 
large back-logs of state reports and individual communications that 
have not yet been considered requests for more meeting time to deal 
with these have been on the table for a long time, first mentioned in 
2006 during the brainstorming meeting on reform of the treaty body 
system, also known as Malbun II.153 But it has been very hard to 
secure the funding for permanent additional meeting time. The 
committees have instead been forced to apply for additional time on 
an ad-hoc basis. CERD, CRC, CEDAW and CAT have been able to 
secure extra meeting time but only temporarily to deal with their 
backlogs.154  But these provisional measures do not sufficiently deal 
with the long-term problems. And the additional meeting time has 
not been accompanied with a corresponding increase in the 
necessary secretarial support.155 The hardship to secure more 
funding has also forced treaty bodies to down-prioritize some parts 
of their mandate in order to just stay afloat. The Subcommittee on the 
Prevention of Torture for example, has due to budgetary constraints 
not yet undertaken an official visit to advise states on national 
preventative mechanism, despite this being one of their tasks 
established in the treaty. 
 The committees have thus not been able to meet as often as they 
have wanted and not been able to perform their tasks due to the fact 
that they need the approval of the General Assembly for the 
additional expenses. Indeed in the Rules of Procedure of the CEDAW 
it is even stated that they can only hold as many meetings as are 
authorized by the state parties.156  
 What does this information tell us about the independence of the 
treaty bodies from a Principal-Trustee perspective? The state parties 
and the General Assembly do not have to issue any reasons for 
denying a request for additional funds or meeting time. It does show 
that the trustee, the monitoring bodies, do not have sufficient 
resources to perform their duties effectively. It also shows that this is 
because of decisions taken by the principal. There have been no 
instances of state parties explicitly referring to the activities or 
outcomes of the treaty bodies as reasons for cutting the budget, (or 
rather, not increasing it to cope with the growth of the system). The 
only thing Principal-Trustee theory tells us is that the budget is a 
clear and useful channel for the principal to let the trustee now what 
the former thinks of the latters work. During the informal 
                                                 
153 Annex to the letter dated 14 September 2006 from the Permanent Representative of 
Liechtenstein to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary General  published 18 
September 2006 UN Doc. A/61/351 p. 6. 
154 GA Res. 63/243 and 63/244 both from 22 February 2009, and 62/218, 12 February 2008,  
155 Note by the Secretary General: Evaluation of the use of additional meeting time by the 
human rights treaty bodies, 27 August 2010, p. 12.  
156 CEDAW Rules of Procedure. Chapter V. Rule 1.  
 49 
consultations that have taken place during the strengthening 
process157 many states have forcefully voiced their distrust of the 
system and alleged that it is being misused for political reasons to 
target certain states. And when taking this resistance to provide 
budgetary means together with the lack of willingness of states to 
report on time according to their obligations it is hard not to infer a 
supposition that at least some states are quite satisfied with the fact 
that the treaty body system has difficulties to function.  Even if 
freezing the budget is not a direct interference in the autonomy of the 
trustee, failing to act to save the system affects the trustee just as 
much.  
3.4 The Independence of the Individual 
Treaty Body Experts 
The budget is not the only tool the principal can use to sanction her 
trustees. The three other measures highlighted by Principal-Trustee 
theory and mentioned above are: A) dismissing the trustee, B) not re-
electing her and C) re-writing the delegation contract. These three all 
relate to sanctioning of the individual experts of the committees. 
They will now be examined starting with the possibilities the 
member states have to dismiss trustees that are not living up to the 
expectations of the states. 
 When it comes to true agents firing is often the first natural 
reaction for many principals when they are unhappy with the way 
the agent is acting. When it comes to trustees it is often more 
difficult. Since the trustee is created in order to bring credibility to a 
system, there are often safeguards against frivolous dismissals in the 
founding documents.  
 This is also the case when it comes to the monitoring bodies. 
None of the treaties allow for state parties, neither alone nor 
collectively to dismiss an expert of a treaty body. In half of the 
treaties158 dismissal is not mentioned at all. Some treaties159 mention 
that in circumstances when an expert is not able to perform her 
duties, a new one shall be appointed, but no details are given on who 
decides when someone is deemed to not be able to function any 
longer. The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
gives this choice to the expert herself: only if she declares that she no 
longer can perform her duties shall she be replaced.160 The 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights however gives 
this power to the other experts. If all other members of the Human 
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Rights Council unanimously are of the opinion that an expert has 
ceased to carry out her functions, that position shall be declared 
vacant.161 This method or similar has also been chosen by some of the 
other committees and can be found in the Rules of Procedure they 
themselves have established.162 So far, no post has ever been declared 
vacant due to the inactivity or inability of an expert to perform her 
functions.  
 As a way to influence the individual members dismissal thus 
seems to be an impossible route to take. For this to happen, which it 
only could for a few of the committees, the state parties would need 
to convince every other member of a committee to vote for the 
dismissal of the unwanted one. And even if this were possible, the 
formal reason for dismissal must be absence and inability to 
participate. If states would want to get rid of an expert it would 
hardly be because of inactivity, being over-zealous in her criticism 
seems more likely. This lack of influence has frustrated some state 
parties and this has led to the discussion on codes of conduct, but 
more on this below.  
 If the member states cannot dismiss the experts what other 
means are left to them? As mentioned they also have the possibility 
to refuse to re-appoint a trustee when the term runs out. Indeed P-T 
theory tells us that it is in appointment and re-appointment politics 
that the principals have one of the greatest opportunities to secure a 
trustee they are comfortable with.163 What are the practical 
possibilities for this in the treaty body system? 
 The experts serving in the committees all serve for mandate 
periods of four years (except for Subcommittee on the Prevention of 
Torture that only serve for two). All except CERD and CEDAW 
allow for re-election at least once.164  This, it would seem, provides 
for plenty of incentive for the experts to keep a friendly relationship 
with the member states. Especially when considering that experts 
can only be nominated by the state they share nationality with and 
can only be re-appointed if they are re-nominated.165 The experts 
must therefore remain on good footing with their respective ‘home’ 
states as well as with the majority of states needed in order to get the 
necessary votes. The relationship with the ‘home’ state is however 
seldom put to the test since experts rarely participate in the 
consideration of the state of their nationality. This is explicitly 
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prohibited in the Rules of procedure for some committees166 and is 
custom for the others.  All experts make a solemn statement before 
taking office guaranteeing their impartiality167 and this is generally 
taken to include that they shall refrain from considering their own 
state.  
 It is hard to deny that the fact that the expert need to be re-
elected after only four years (and for Subcommittee on the 
Prevention of Torture only two!) gives a very strong tool to the 
principal to get rid of experts speaking out in a way they do not 
approve of. Even though the last paragraphs show that experts only 
rarely would be put in a situation were they would risk angering 
their home state and thereby losing their nomination for re-election 
the risk that the community of state parties as a whole would 
disprove of an expert is very much real. The election process has 
therefore not surprisingly been very criticized during the current 
strengthening process. There have been many calls for a more 
transparent and participatory election process.168 However since it is 
the States that nominate and elect the members, it is only they who 
can change the process in order to bring forward better-suited and 
more out-spoken experts. But from a rational-choice point of view, it 
is easy to see how this is not likely to change any time soon. Many 
states are perfectly happy with the way many candidates are brought 
forward today and have no incentive to open up the process. There 
are exceptions169 speaking out against the bargaining character of the 
election process. Criticizing that states bargain to make deals with 
each other to secure votes for their candidates along the lines of “if 
you vote for my candidate for the Human Rights Council then I will 
vote for your General Assembly resolution that you are trying to get 
through”. The fact remains that the control the member states have 
over the election and re-appointment process gives them clear 
channel to indirectly influence the work of the treaty bodies. 
 One of the defining criteria that makes an actor or group of 
actors into a principal is that it, or they, control the delegation 
contract: the document giving power and authority to the trustee or 
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agent.170 This also gives the principal a strong sanctioning 
mechanism. Since it is the principal who wrote the original contract, 
she can also re-write it if she is not happy with how the delegation is 
working so far. This is a common way to maintain some kind of 
control over the agents.  However dealing with trustees is quite 
different from dealing with true agents in a relationship in business, 
where for instance a company has set up a regional office 
somewhere. In this case the contracts are renegotiable and if the 
principal is not happy with the way the delegation is working she 
can rewrite the contract, and if the agent is not ready to accept these 
new terms, there is always the risk that she will be fired. When it 
comes to principals that consist of many different actors, or states, as 
in the case of the treaty body system, the situation is a bit more 
complicated. In this context it is the multi-lateral treaties establishing 
the monitoring bodies that have to be changed. To re-write these is 
very difficult.  
 All of the human rights treaties include, more or less detailed, 
provisions regulating the procedure for changing them.171 The most 
common process is that one state proposes a change. If, within four 
months, at least one third of the state parties are in favor of having a 
conference to discuss the amendment, the Secretary General shall 
convene one. If, during this conference, a majority of the states 
present adopts the amendment, then it shall be submitted to the 
General Assembly. After the General Assembly has approved the 
amendment it will enter into force when two-thirds of the state 
parties to the treaty has accepted it. It will however only be binding 
on those states that have accepted it.172 In the relations between one 
state that has accepted and one that has not, it is still the old treaty 
without the amendment that applies. This however is somewhat of a 
truism. If a proposed amendment for instance changes the 
composition of a treaty body. This was the case with the amendment 
of the Convention on the Rights of the Child approved by General 
Assembly resolution 50/155 changing article 43 (2) and increasing 
the number of experts from ten to eighteen.173 It entered into force in 
2002 when the 128th state accepted it, bringing the total to two thirds 
of the state parties. According to the article 50 of Convention on the 
Rights of the Child this should not be binding on states that had not 
yet accepted the change, but it is of course unreasonable to think that 
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two committees should exist at the same time, one with ten and one 
with eighteen members. This is a classic paradox of international law. 
 Since none of the treaties explicitly prohibits it, the Vienna 
convention also opens up for the theoretical possibility to changes 
the treaties only apply between two states parties. This is allowed as 
long as it would not affect the enjoyment of the rights or obligations 
of any other party.174 Given the structure of the system, however, 
and the paradox just mentioned, it seems hard to imagine a situation 
were this would be practically enforceable. Any change that would 
affect the committee or its members would naturally also affect the 
other states enjoyment of the convention.  
 These procedures make amending the treaties very difficult. It 
has happened, for instance the just mentioned expansion of the 
number of experts of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, but 
it is very rare. Another way of changing how the system works is to 
draft an Optional Protocol. This is a common way of adding features 
that for some reason were left out in the original drafting of the 
treaty. This has been done to add material rights, such as the Second 
Optional protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights aiming at the abolition of the death penalty or the Optional 
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale of 
children, child prostitution and child pornography, or to add 
procedural structures such as the many optional protocols 
establishing individual complaints mechanisms.175 The drafting of a 
optional protocol is somewhat like a mixture between drafting an 
entire new convention and amending an already existing treaty as 
per above.  
 But neither amending treaties nor creating optional protocols 
provide state parties with a convenient way to influence the experts 
of the monitoring bodies. As a sanctioning mechanism they are both 
extremely cumbersome. The independence of the treaty bodies seems 
quite unthreatened on this account. The principal does have the 
possibility to use what is called the nuclear option when she is very 
unsatisfied with how the trustees are working. This entails 
disbanding the entire system.176 It the context of today however, this 
seems extremely unlikely. Not only does it require collective decision 
making by all the state parties to the convention. It would not only 
rid the principal of the unruly trustees, it would also destroy all the 
positive benefits that motivated the creation of the system in the first 
place. Changing the delegation contract is nevertheless not 
completely unlikely. During the on-going strengthening process 
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there have been much talk by states of implementing some sort of 
code of conduct as a way to control the individual experts. This 
debate has from time to time been so heated that it merits 
examination in its own right. Even though it falls under the P-T 
theory of re-writing contracts it will therefore be granted its own 
subchapter below. 
3.4.1 Code of Conduct and Its Effects on 
Independence 
In the previous chapter it was shown how difficult it is for the state 
parties to sanction the experts of the treaty bodies by changing the 
delegation contract. There exists however one such change that is 
being discussed at the moment that cannot be disregarded without 
examination on the merits. This is the debate on a Code of Conduct. 
Such a code, created by the states and written into the treaties would 
create a set of rules that the experts would have to abide by. These 
rules are meant as a way for the states to guarantee impartial 
investigation of their human rights records, free from politically 
motivated confrontations. Calls for such a code has been made at all 
the state consultations hosted during the strengthening process.177 It 
has also been explicitly taken up in some of the states’ individual 
written submissions on proposals during the process.178 
 This Code of Conduct is meant to prevent abuse of authority and 
misconduct by the experts and to ensure that they do not politicize or 
manipulate the treaties. The code is meant to achieve this without 
impeding the independence of the monitoring bodies, however, this 
has been brought into question.179 Some states complained that 
under the current regime they are, by political reasons, forced to 
answer questions that fall outside of the treaty being considered, 
something that a code would prevent.180 These proposals have been 
strongly opposed by the treaty body experts themselves, mainly with 
the claim that the experts already self-regulate themselves.181  
 This begs the question: what mechanisms of guaranteeing the 
impartiality of the experts exist today? The solemn declaration 
experts take when beginning their mandate has already been 
                                                 
177 Sion Report, supra note 169, p. 18; Report of the Second Consultation with States 
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mentioned182 but deserved to be examined a bit further. The 
Committee on the Rights of the Child declaration is as follows:  
 
I solemnly declare that I will perform my duties and 
exercise my powers as a member of the Committee 
on the Rights of the Child honourably, faithfully, 
impartially and conscientiously.183 
 
The declarations of the other committees are very similar. Some 
mention the principle of non-discrimination as well. As stated in the 
treaties to be elected the members also need to be of ”high moral 
character”.184 None of these are enforceable in any way. To call the 
system self-regulating is therefore an exaggeration at best. The rules 
of procedure of Committee on Enforced Disappearances explicitly 
state that the experts are accountable only to the Committee and to 
their own conscience.185 It should not be very surprising that some 
states are not comfortable with the conscience of the experts as the 
only enforcement mechanism guaranteeing impartiality.  
 The HRC has also adopted an internal set of guidelines relating 
to the impartiality of its members. These guidelines characterize 
independence as an “essential” principle requiring that “the 
members are not removable during their term of office and are not 
subject to direction or influence of any kind, or to pressure from the 
state or its agencies in regard to the performance of their duties.”186 
The rest of these guidelines concern the conduct of the members of 
the committee and requires them to not directly involve themselves 
when it comes to reports and communications that concern their 
country of nationality.  Further, they are urged, but only in a non-
binding manner, not to participate in the governance of international 
NGOs that deal with the Committee. It is also states that they should 
abstain from participation in any political body of the United 
Nations or of any other intergovernmental organization concerned 
with human rights and abstain from acting as experts, consultants or 
counsels for any Government in a manner that might come up for 
consideration before the committee”187 However, there is no 
prohibition keeping the experts from working for their own 
government while in office as experts, and indeed many them do so 
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(18 percent of the experts of all committees are currently serving as 
diplomats or government officials).188  
 Such internal guidelines have been brought up as an alternative 
to state enforced codes of conduct.189 During the treaty bodies 
Chairpersons meeting in Addis Ababa in June 2012 such a set of 
guidelines was discussed and endorsed. It has not become final yet 
as it is for each of the committees to adopt into their rules of 
procedure. This draft contains general principles on independence 
and impartiality as well as detailed rules on conflict of interests and 
relationships with states.190  The implementation of these guidelines 
can be seen as an effort by the OHCHR and the treaty bodies to come 
out from under the pressure applied by the states. If there already is 
a concrete framework on impartiality in place, it will be harder for 
states to push through a new set of rules via a Code of Conduct. The 
General Assembly resolution establishing the inter governmental 
working group that is responsible for drafting the final proposal of 
the entire strengthening process has even a reference to the 
guidelines contained in the High Commissioner’s report even though 
it was not published at the time when the resolution was issued.191  
3.4.2 Are Treaty Body Experts Powerful 
Enough to Warrant Accountability?  
The answer to the question if the treaty bodies shall have to abide by 
a code of conduct issued by the states or if internal guidelines are 
enough depends on how one looks at accountability. Who is it that 
shall be hall be held accountable?  
 Not everyone is in a position that merits the scrutiny of her 
actions by others. As early as 1690 John Locke stated that one of the 
central principles of accountability is that people with power ought 
to be held accountable to those who have entrusted them with it. 
And the standard for recognizing abuses of power will be violations 
of that trust: acting beyond the authority of the office or in violation 
of its purposes.192 Locke only wrote about those who have power, he 
did not concern himself with those who do not. This means that there 
is no need to hold the powerless to account. There is in other words a 
minimum level of power required for a person or entity to be 
classified as a power wielder and for the standards of accountability 
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to apply.193 A more recent scholar, Philip Alston, has also concluded 
that actors wielding significant power should be held accountable.194 
On the topic of accountability Klabbers, quotes Frankenstein’s 
monster: “You are my creator, but I am your master; obey!”195 The 
states have created the TB system but now they are subject to the 
opinions and recommendations of their creation. And to a certain 
extent this is a frightening scenario for states when dealing with 
strong international organizations. Such organizations are in general 
considered to wield enough power to qualify as power wielders to be 
held accountable. But this is on the aggregate scale when looking at 
the institution as a whole, not their individual members. Turpin 
writes that responsibility should only be commensurate to the extent 
of the power possessed.196 Thus, if the degree of accountability 
depends on the degree of power, we must ask ourselves, how 
powerful are the Treaty body experts?  
 There is no entity tied to the system that allows them to enforce 
their decisions. All they can do is issue views and recommendations 
and hope that the state targeted will absorb the criticism. This is a 
tool called naming and shaming. It may seem as a very weak 
instrument but it does seem to have a certain effect. One study, also 
in the human rights context, came to the conclusion that naming and 
shaming is not able to prevent future violations but that it does lead 
to states taking some steps in the direction intended.197 
 Another way to look at the power the treaty bodies wield is to 
look at how they are perceived by the international community of 
states. When the Subcommittee on the Prevention of Torture was 
established the optional protocol creating it took a very long time to 
draft since it encountered a lot of resistance. When the Commission 
on Human Rights finally adopted it the United States of America, 
who abstained during the vote, issued a statement in which it argued 
that the powers given to the Subcommittee on the Prevention of 
Torture would be incompatible with principles of accountability and 
the need for reasonable checks and balances on any grant of 
power.198 This proves that at least some member states perceive the 
treaty bodies to wield quite some power.  
 This might seem a vague way to measure power but it might be 
the more concrete examples to be found. In chapter 2 a study on the 
impact of the treaty body system was cited that provides some more 
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practical outcomes.199 But the truth is that the system deals with such 
abstract concepts that it will always be very difficult to measure its 
practical impact. Especially when it comes to such mandates as the 
general comments and the treaty bodies’ power as norm creators. 
These only give long-term effects as they influence the mind-set of 
different stakeholders, together with a range of other actors. Perhaps 
in deciding if the treaty bodies should be held accountable one can 
look at other similar actors and see how the international community 
has regulated their mandates. 
3.4.3 Other Actors Facing Similar Problems  
The treaty bodies are not the only actors on the international arena 
who are facing problems relating to independence. Perhaps it is 
possible to draw some conclusions by examining some of these other 
actors. By looking at actors in situations potentially analogous to the 
treaty bodies and how independent they are, it might be possible to 
draw some conclusions with validity also for the treaty bodies.  
 It deserves to be mentioned that the development in the 
international arena has been towards more accountability for quite 
some time now. Examples include the UN in general,200 the World 
Bank201 and the IMF202. They have all been forced to implement 
policies on accountability to satisfy the beneficiaries. When it comes 
to humanitarian affairs there have been accountability initiatives 
both at the inter-governmental and non-governmental level. Both the 
UNHCR203 and the UN human rights field workers of the OHCHR204 
have had accountability standards implemented.  
 Even NGO’s have been under pressure to show that they are 
accountable.205 In 2005 the International Non-Governmental 
Organizations’ Accountability Charter was adopted. This states that 
the signatories should be held responsible for their actions and 
achievements, act in accordance with their stated values and 
procedures as well as to report on their outcomes in an open and 
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accurate manner.206 The International Committee of the Red Cross 
now has its own code of professional standards.207 But these 
examples relate more to people actively working in the field. The role 
of the treaty body experts is quite different. It is more akin to that of 
the judge, and judges, while not being under strict monitoring 
mechanism have long had some methods of securing impartiality. It 
can be through something as vague an oath of office or detailed 
provisions on conflicts of interest. 
 The entities to be examined are therefore International Civil 
Servants, the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council and 
International Judges. These have been chosen since they all struggle 
with similar problems of independence and they all, in one way or 
another, answer to the international collective of states.  
   
A UN Civil servants 
International civil servants, meaning professionals employed full 
time as officials at international organizations, is a very broad 
category. The following will direct its attention only to officers 
working for the UN.208 Article 100 of the UN Charter states that 
officers are “responsible only to the organization”. This was deemed 
to be enough for a long time but in 2009 a new system of 
accountability was established. The General Assembly held that the 
old system was cumbersome and ineffective and lacking in 
professionalism and wanted one that was independent, transparent, 
professionalized adequately resourced and decentralized.209  The 
system implemented is a very complex one, with many different 
types of mechanisms such as judicial bodies to which disputes or 
appeals can be brought.210  
 This system is now what is holding the UN staff accountable. 
Although it does not work perfectly, which is evident by all the 
scandals of peacekeepers who have been abusing and exploiting 
others.  However this criticism is a bit misdirected since the UN 
internal system is not directed towards criminal activities but rather 
how the internal life of the organization shall be managed. In dealing 
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with nationals living in a country it is still that nations laws that 
apply. This criticism also falls a bit outside the scope of this paper 
since neither the internal guidelines of the treaty bodies or the 
proposed codes of conduct are meant to deal with criminal activity 
either. 
 What can be taken from these UN wide guidelines that is 
relevant to the present discussion is that according to this system, 
officers who are accused of misconduct are held to account, just as in 
the old system. The difference is that now responses of senior 
managers, including the Secretary General, to such allegations are 
subject to a more meaningful scrutiny, review and appeal.211 For the 
treaty bodies this could mean that it is not who can complain or how 
a complaint is lodged that should matter, but what the resulting 
process would be. And this is very much at the heart of the 
differences between the Code of Conduct and the guidelines where 
the latter can only lead to internal, not quite transparent, processes.  
 In general it can be said that, when it comes to international civil 
servants, the system has changed recently giving much more focus to 
accountability. This is in line with the recent developments 
mentioned above. We have now left the days of Dag Hammarskjöld, 
who believed in creating a class of civil servants who should be 
independent and only this independence could prevent them from 
falling prey to corruption. Today the pendulum has noticeably 
swung back towards accountability. But we need to be careful with 
what conclusions to draw from this regarding the treaty body 
experts. Their work is quite different from that of ordinary UN civil 
servants 
 
B Special Procedures 
The special procedures of the human rights council is the entity that 
has been mentioned the most in the discussions on treaty body 
independence.  Special procedure is the general name used to 
describe all the human rights mechanisms established by the Human 
Rights Council (previously the Human Rights Commission). When 
the council finds the human rights situation in a specific country or 
concerning a specific theme needs extra scrutiny, it appoints an 
individual (either as a Special Rapporteur or as an Independent 
Expert) or a group (called a Working Group) to examine this specific 
situation. The first mandate, the Working Group on Enforced or 
Involuntary Disappearances, was established in 1980 and today there 
are 48 different mandates, twelve of which concern specific countries 
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and 36 thematic.212  The country specific mandates are finished when 
the council deems that the situation no longer warrants extra 
scrutiny, however the thematic mandates are rarely discontinued.213 
The functions of the special procedures include urgent action and 
contact with the concerned authorities, fact-finding missions, 
examination of the global aspects of a type of violation and 
clarification of the legal framework of the right concerned.214 
 The special procedures have also followed the general trend 
towards more accountability and in June 2007 the Human Rights 
Council adopted a resolution containing a code of conduct for the 
special procedures mandate-holders.215 This code contains both 
general principles of conduct as well as detailed instructions on how 
to perform field visits. The most severe provision is the last one that 
states that the mandate-holders are accountable to the Council.216 
They were accountable to the council even before this provision but 
the effect of its implementation is that there is now a clear list of do’s 
and don’ts that the council can use to judge the behavior of the 
mandate-holders against. The Special Rapporteurs themselves tried 
to avoid this and adopted a manual on their own providing 
guidelines on their working methods and an Internal Advisory 
Procedure to review their working methods that was meant to be a 
self-regulating process of the entire Special Procedures system. This 
was not enough, however, and the Council still pushed through with 
the code of conduct. 
 How much can be drawn from comparing the treaty body 
experts to the mandate-holders of the Special procedures? They 
differ in number of important manners. The treaty bodies are more 
independent to begin with. They were created once, and then more 
or less left to their own devices. The state parties retain some ways to 
influence their behavior, as mentioned above but it is very different 
from the Special Procedures. They are created with a specific 
mandate to perform a specific function. If the council, who is the 
principal in this relationship, is not happy with how the mandate-
holder is performing, it is much easier for it to terminate the mission 
or appoint someone else as rapporteur. The Special Procedures 
mandate holders serve at the discretion of the Human Rights 
Council. This means that there has always been a much larger 
interference in their independence than in that of the treaty bodies. 
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They also differ somewhat in their mandate. The task of the special 
procedure is to issue harsh criticisms of state behavior. They only 
exist because of grave human rights breaches; it is only in such 
situations mandates are created. Their task is not, in contrast to that 
of the treaty bodies, to hold constructive dialogues and issue 
recommendations, but rather to tell states the hard truth. This does 
not mean that no conclusions can be drawn what so ever, only that 
they need to be drawn with care. The mandate-holders of the human 
rights council and the treaty bodies are indeed very much alike when 
it comes to their struggle to avoid control by their respective 
principals, as shown by their respective resistance to Codes of 
Conduct.  
 
C International Judges 
The Treaty Body experts can also be compared to international 
judges, and when it comes to the individual communications 
mechanisms they are indeed quite similar.  
 When it comes to judicial independence the Bangalore Principal 
of Judicial Conduct is one of the main international statements.217 
They are a set of standards meant for international judges but they 
can perhaps also help us understand the situation of the treaty body 
members. 
 Judicial independence is a corner stone in any society and it is 
guaranteed in almost every human rights treaty.218 There are also a 
high number of soft law standards that have been adopted in efforts 
to spell out the specific requirements that are derived from this 
general principle. As mentioned the best known of these are the 
Bangalore Principles of 2002, which build on the 1985 Basic 
Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary.219 Of the two, the 
earlier version is very rudimentary and the section dealing with 
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judicial independence only states that: ”the independence of the 
judiciary shall be guaranteed by the State” and that: 
 
“The judiciary shall decide matter before them 
impartially, on the basis of facts and in accordance 
with the law, without any restrictions, improper 
influences, inducements, pressures, threats or 
interferences, direct or indirect, from any quarter or 
for any reason.” 
 
The principles also acknowledge that each member state has the duty 
to provide adequate resources to enable the judiciary to properly 
perform its functions.220221 The 2002 principles are more detailed but 
in the effort to make them relevant for as many different judicial 
systems as possible they have been distilled down to list of rules for 
how the judge should behave, what he or she should and should not 
do.  It has been criticized for not taking all the relevant contextual 
and environmental notions that many consider to be important when 
discussing judicial independence.222  
 In the scholarly debate three different methods in approaching 
judicial independence can be identified. One focuses on the 
institutional dimensions and emphasizes elements such as judicial 
tenure, how the appointment process is regulated (mainly if it is not 
only under the control of one branch of government) and the 
judiciaries power to decide its budget for itself and how the 
accountability processes work.223 
 The second method puts less emphasis on how the institutions 
work and instead focuses on how capable judges are to exercise 
discretion in individual cases and the extent it is possible for them to 
come to their decisions without fear of negative consequences.224  
 The last method stresses that independence is a term that is 
relative and needs to be understood through analyses of the judiciary 
that examine how independent it is from something else. The 
independence of a particular judge for example, can only be 
understood by identifying the other entity from which its 
independence is measured. Another version of this is to look at 
judicial independence as the result from the interaction of the 
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judiciary, the legislature and the executive. It can therefore grow or 
shrink depending on how powerful the other branches of 
governments are.225 To this approach one could also add how 
independent the judiciary is from the media. So when comparing the 
treaty body experts to judges, it must be noted that there is not one 
single idea of what independence of judges mean.  
 When it comes to accountability, which as discussed above can 
be a counterbalance to independence, the Basic Principles from 1985 
allows for the application of sanctions in specific circumstances. They 
allow for the removal of judges but there are strict criteria for when 
this should be possible, such as incapacity or behavior making them 
unfit to perform their duties. Such sanctions should however be 
subject to an independent review.226 Although this process may be 
different depending on the country, it is almost universal today to 
have some sort of mechanism to hold judges accountable and even to 
remove them from office, in the case of very grave misconduct227 
One thing that most of them have in common is that the review 
should not be performed by people who have any previous 
relationship with the judges under review.228 
 Similar mechanisms also apply to international courts and 
tribunals. But it varies between the different systems. One strategy is 
to give all or most of the power to the other judges of the Court, for 
instance to have an unanimous vote of all the other members as the 
only means of dismissal of one of the judges. This is the case in the 
International Court of Justice229, The international Tribunal on the 
Law of the Sea230 and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights.231 The European Court of Human Rights follows the same 
procedure but only requires two thirds of the judges to vote in favor 
of dismissal.232 It can also be up to the member states to decide, as in 
the case of the Inter-American Court where it is a two-thirds majority 
vote by the member states of the Organization of American States 
and the State Parties to the Convention that is needed.233 The 
International Criminal Court has merged these ideas and demands a 
two-thirds majority vote from both the judges and the States Parties 
in order to dismiss a judge.234 When it comes to internal codes of 
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conduct, the international courts have generally opted for a self-
regulating mechanism.  
 The two tribunals that were established in 2009 to deal with 
internal administrative misconduct, the United Nations Dispute 
Tribunal and the United Nations Appeals Tribunal have a much 
lesser protection of the tenure of their judges. These Judges can be 
dismissed by just a simple majority vote of the General Assembly.235 
When these tribunals were set up the General Assembly made a 
request to the Internal Justice Council to draft a code of conduct.236 In 
2010 the Council submitted their draft code, which contains very 
comprehensive provisions on many different aspect of 
independence, from impartiality and transparency to fairness and 
diligence.237 The stated purpose of the document is (only) to provide 
guidance, which has been interpreted as meaning that it would be 
part of a self-regulatory system, not tied to any sort of compliance 
mechanism.238 
 This is interesting when comparing to the treaty bodies. On the 
one hand the experts seem to be even more independent than the 
international judges just mentioned since all of them are subject to 
rules that allows for dismissal. This is something only the Human 
Rights Committee has and then only by the unanimous vote of all 
other experts. But on a closer examination this might not be the case. 
Because even if the experts of the treaty bodies are very hard, or even 
impossible, to dismiss during their tenure, they are still subject to re-
election after only four years239 while international judges generally 
hold their offices longer.240  
3.5 Conclusions on Independence 
In the above subchapters Principal–Trustee theory has been 
explained and then applied to the UN treaty body system. The 
monitoring bodies have also been compared to some other actors on 
the international arena who struggle for independence. What 
conclusion can be drawn from this? How independent did the treaty 
bodies turn out to be? In the following I will try to summarize my 
findings on the scope of the treaty bodies autonomy.   
                                                 
235 G.A. Res. 63/253, 24 December 2008, Annex I art. 4, para. 10, Annex II art. 3, 
para. 10. 
236 G.A. Res. 62/228, 6 February 2008, para. 37. 
237 Report of the Internal Justice Council, Code of Conducts for the Judges of the 
United Nations Dispute Tribunal and the United Nations Appeals Tribunal, 15 June 
2010, Annex. U.N. Doc. A/65/86 (June 15, 2010).  
238 Alston, P. supra note 14, p. 624. 
239 Or less, in the case of the Subcommittee Against Torture. 
240 Seven years in the case of the European Court of Human Rights, nine for the 
International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court etc. 
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 Let us begin with the conclusions that can be drawn from the 
theoretical framework used.  In chapter three it was shown that P-T 
theory suggests four main ways to sanction agents and trustees. The 
easier it is for a given principal to use this tool, the less independent 
the trustee is. These were to fire or fail to reappoint the trustee, to 
change the delegation contract and to change the budget. It was 
shown that it was very difficult for the state collective making up the 
principal for the treaty monitoring bodies to fire individual experts 
whose actions do not approve of. It was also hard for the states to 
amend the treaties and apply pressure on the experts that way. These 
two factors point towards the treaty bodies being fairly independent.  
 However, the states do have control over the budget and can 
change it fairly easy and above all, they are in charge of re-
appointing the experts after only very short terms. These two factors 
point towards the states’ collective to have some influence over the 
way the system works. P-T theory also points out that threats are 
likely very ineffective when dealing with trustees with a very high 
sense of professional ethics, robbing states of another important 
instrument in shaping their behavior. These factors would together 
lean towards the conclusion that the system if fairly independent. 
There are channels that are open for the states to use to influence the 
actions of the experts, but there are others that are closed. Just the 
fact that the treaty bodies fits more easily into the model of trustees 
than true agents should also give some presumption towards 
independence. 
 Alter also put forward the concept of agency slack as a way to 
determine the independence of an agent. This is an accepted part of 
the principal-agent relationship but also has some relevance when 
applied to trustees. As mentioned above241 agency slack is defined as 
behavior not wanted or approved of by the principal. The size of the 
agency slack experienced by a trustee is dependent on three things: 
the amount of information disparities, that is how much the agent 
knows that the principle does not; how difficult, or how high the 
costs are, to change the delegation contract; and how hard it is to 
replace agents the principle find misbehaving.242 These criteria leads 
us to believe that determining the agency slack, and through that, 
also the independence of an agent is quite straightforward, but this 
has been criticized. Alter states that P-A theory has a hard time 
determining the autonomy of agents when these three factors do not 
coincide.243 What happens if the information disparities are high, but 
the costs of redoing the contract low and there are no protection of 
the employment of slacking agents? When the factors are pointing in 
                                                 
241 See supra text accompanying note 120. 
242 Alter, K. J., supra note 15, p. 37. 
243 Ibid., pp. 36–37. 
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different directions, the model loses a lot of its power in describing 
the relationship.  
 In one study P-A theory was used to describe the ECJ as not very 
independent because judges needed to be reappointed after only a 
short time in office and therefore were to be assumed to be eager not 
to anger the principal. But in another study the same model was 
used to arrive at the conclusion that the ECJ was independent 
because it is so hard to change the rules of the court, an amendment 
to the treaty requires unanimous support of all EU member states.244 
So two studies using the same theory, studying the same subject, 
came up with two different conclusions. This is valid criticism but 
rather than falsify the utility of the whole theory of P-A it tells us to 
be careful when giving importance to conflicting factors.  
 When applying the three criteria to the UN treaty body system it 
indicates that they maintain a quite large amount of agency slack, 
and therefore can be considered quite independent. The information 
disparities are quite high. The treaty body members are experts that 
receive information from a host of different sources, such as civil 
society organizations and many members also often have personal 
contacts working in the field. They are all qualified in their respective 
area of expertize, something that cannot always be said for those 
representing the member states. The information disparities thereby 
points towards the treaty bodies being relatively independent. As 
subchapter 3.3 shows, it is also very difficult to change the delegation 
contract. This is another factor pointing towards independence. The 
last criterion mentioned by Alter is how difficult it is to replace the 
trustees. In the case of the treaty body members this sends a mixed 
message. On the one hand, they are almost impossible to fire, but on 
the other they have to be re-elected after only a quite short period of 
service.245 All in all this leads to the conclusion that the treaty bodies 
are fairly independent, more so at least than was the pre-
understanding of this author at the outset. 
 
                                                 
244 Tallberg, J., Delegation to Supranational Institutions, pp. 23–46. 
245 As was discussed supra in the text accompanying notes 165-170. 
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4 Final thoughts 
When the framework of Principal-Trustee theory was applied to the 
UN treaty body system in the last chapter, I arrived at the conclusion 
that the system is fairly independent. However there are some 
factors that the theory does not take into consideration, factors that 
still are of importance for the independence of the monitoring 
bodies.  
 One is that the states are not only the principal of the system; 
they are also the main targets of its activities. As such they have 
another way of affecting the work of the treaty bodies. The system is 
dependent on the states in a number of key aspects. The states are 
responsible for handing in the reports on which the concluding 
observations are based. They are also supposed to participate in a 
constructive dialogue during which these reports should be 
discussed and, most of all, they are the ones that are responsible for 
the implementation of the recommendations the treaty bodies issue. 
This gives a considerable power to the state that P-T theory does not 
take into consideration.  
 The state can refuse to hand in their report, or hand it in overdue 
or with errors. This will post-pone the constructive dialogue, 
sometimes for years. They can refuse to show up for the meetings in 
Geneva. This way the dialogue cannot be held at all. And, since the 
recommendations are non-binding, they can in the end, choose just 
to ignore them, without having to face a worse sanction than being 
criticized at the next hearing. Even though these measures do not 
affect the independence of the treaty body system, they do affect its 
effectiveness. And since the treaty bodies want the system to be 
effective, they might be convinced to hold back on some of their 
criticism in order to get states to participate. This can be seen as an 
indirect influence on their independence. Either they say what they 
want to a state that is not listening, or they say what the state wants 
to hear just to get a dialogue going.   
 The lack of enforcement mechanism that makes the monitoring 
bodies dependent on the states to implement their recommendations 
is nothing unique for the treaty body system. It is present in all 
international law. Nevertheless, in this context it has the consequence 
that the experts have to strike some sort of deal with the states. This 
is never explicit, but a kind of balance needs to be found if the system 
is to have any effect at all. If the experts criticize the states to harshly 
there is always the risk that the states will tire of the scrutiny and just 
withdraw from the system. This does not have to be a public 
statement where the state withdraws officially from the treaty. It can 
take the form of the state just stopping to issue reports and showing 
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up for the meetings. Even though some committees have started 
issuing concluding observations also in instances when states have 
not issued a report or not shown up to the constructive dialogue, the 
likelihood that such recommendations will be heeded is very small. 
This indirect form of pressure is not present in the P-T theory, yet it 
has consequences for how the treaty bodies can act all the same.  
 One sanction mentioned above is the so-called nuclear option: 
the disbandment of the entire treaty body system. This seems very 
unlikely at the moment but to disband might not be the only way to 
rob the system of its power. It has been suggested that the UK under 
Margaret Thatcher realized that they could not withdraw from the 
European Convention of Human Rights without a major loss in 
international prestige. Instead of trying to disband the system, they 
opted to slowly suffocate it. The idea was to allow a large number of 
eastern European states, with human rights records far below the 
standards of the court, into the system. Their presence, before they 
had raised their minimum standard to the level first deemed 
necessary to join, would flood the court with cases that it simply 
lacked the resources to deal with. This would leave it incapable of 
what was deemed as meddling in British internal affairs. A similar 
line of reasoning might have crossed a few of the state parties to the 
UN human rights treaties. Instead of withdrawing or trying to 
disband the system, actions that would lead to much negative 
publicity, states can, just by doing nothing and to vote against any 
proposals for raised funds, put the treaty body system in a position 
where it is simply unable to perform its functions. It would be 
suffocated by its mounting backlogs and the states would very rarely 
have to concern themselves with it. The treaty body experts know 
this and realize that time is against them and that they need to drum 
up support for the system among the member states as soon as 
possible. This puts the states in a very strong negotiating position 
and is definitely a threat to the monitoring bodies’ independence.  
 Another difficulty when it comes to the treaty body system that 
the P-T theory does take into account, but only slightly, is the 
complexity of having a principal that is made up of several entities. 
As was shown in Chapter 2.1 there are many different reasons whys 
states elect to cooperate with the system. Some might do it to 
improve the human rights situation in other countries; others to gain 
legitimacy within their own electorate and others still might only 
participate because of expected gains in other fields of international 
diplomacy. This plurality of motives makes it even harder to predict 
the behavior of the relevant actors especially since there seems to be 
different consequences for different groups of states.  
 Of all the states parties to any of the conventions there is one 
group that engages actively. They submit their reports on time, show 
up for the constructive dialogues and generally at least try to 
 70 
implement the recommendations given. Then there is another group 
who tries to shy away from the system, reporting late if at all and 
hardly bothering to respect recommendations or answer follow-up 
questions. Of course there is no clear cut line between the two groups 
but rather a continuum and sometimes a state that is very 
cooperative when it come s to one committee can be very stubborn in 
its dealings with another. This duality in approaches to the system 
leads to somewhat of a paradox. It is the states that are active and 
trying to oblige that receives the most criticism from the experts 
while the other group manages to be left alone. The reward for 
higher participation is more negative reactions. This of course has a 
negative impact on the will of states to participate in reforming the 
system into something more effective. Why should I help when it is 
only me that is being criticized, despite that other state’s appalling 
human rights record? This was made painfully clear throughout the 
informal consultations in Sion, Geneva and New York during the 
strengthening process. Some states truly care about reforming the 
system so that it can be made effective while others are perfectly 
happy with the status quo, others yet would rather use the on-going 
process as an opportunity to bend the system to what would match 
their own preferences.  
 Be that as it may, this divergence in state preferences does also 
have another consequence. As was made clear in chapter 3, in order 
to sanction the treaty bodies the states need to find some level of 
agreement. To appoint an expert you need a certain number of votes, 
to change the budget you need a majority in the General Assembly 
and to amend a treaty you need nothing less than the support of two 
thirds of the state parties. This makes the strengthening process of 
the system painstakingly difficult but it can also be seen as a bulwark 
against unwanted state interference that is actually improving the 
independence of the monitoring bodies. If the state collective always 
were in agreement it would be a lot easier for them to apply the 
sanctions mentioned in this thesis to impose their will on the experts. 
In the world as it stands today, with many different state interests 
opposing each other, this might be the best guarantee the experts’ 
independence have got.  
 But if this thesis has shown that the experts have a quite strong 
independence, it begs another question: should they? Subchapter 
3.3.2 discusses accountability and that only those that wield a certain 
amount of power need to be held accountable for their actions. Does 
the treaty body experts fall within this category of the powerful? In 
order to answer that question it is first necessary to understand what 
accountability means for independence. There are many ways to be 
held accountable, but the one that is relevant for this discussion is 
that proposed through the Code of Conduct, that is, external 
accountability to norms set up by the states, separate from the treaty 
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bodies themselves. To be held accountable does not necessarily mean 
a limitation of an actor’s independence. As long as the code of 
conduct is respected, the treaty body experts would be independent 
to do whatever they please. However, there is also the risk that the 
states would misuse the accountability mechanism as a way do 
discredit an voice of the treaty bodies, especially when that voice is 
criticizing the states. Even a treaty body expert who abides by the 
code could be accused of breaching it, and even if the accusation 
were unfounded it would still raise doubts about, and draw attention 
from, the point the expert was making. An actor answering to an 
accountability structure is not necessarily a puppet, but the risk is 
higher than for one who answers only to her self.   
 The comparison with other actors in chapter 3.3.3 showed, with 
the possible exception of international judges, that there is a general 
trend towards demanding more accountability from actors on the 
international stage. The limit of their independence seems to be 
worth the cost. This is something the state parties are very aware of 
and some have tried to surf this wave and to use it in order to 
implement code of conducts also for the treaty body experts. There 
are many arguments that can be found to both support and oppose a 
state controlled accountability procedure but in the end it comes 
down to what serves the purpose of the system best. The problem is 
that the purpose is not one hundred percent clear. Are states 
supposed to submit reports and participate in meetings to really 
have a genuinely constructive dialogue where problems can be 
discussed and different sides of arguments weighed against each 
other? Or is the treaty bodies just a tool for the international 
community to use to name and shame states no matter how little it 
will actually change their behavior? If one genuinely supports the 
idea of an inclusive system that takes the states’ views seriously, a 
code of conduct might not be the worst of ideas. But one still has to 
realize that a code of conduct will provide the non-cooperative states 
with yet another tool to bring into doubt the views of the 
committees, making it easier for human rights violating states to 
defend their actions, lessening the impact of naming and shaming. It 
is the opinion of this author that what could possibly be gained by 
increased legitimacy through a code of conduct would not outweigh 
the costs of forcing the treaty experts to defend themselves from 
accusations of breaches of the code from states with no interest in 
cooperating in the first place.  
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